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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the United States commenced its first criminal proceedings
against a handful of Guantanamo detainees. Rather than trying them before
traditional federal courts, the United States chose to try them before military
commissions for violations of the laws of war.' One such detainee, Salim
Ahmed Hamdan-known to the world as Osama bin Laden's driver-
challenged the government's authority to subject him to trial by military
commission on the charge of conspiracy, claiming both that the military
commission trials violated the Geneva Conventions and that military com-
missions lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over charges of conspiracy, the
only offense he was charged with.2 In doing so, Hamdan inextricably linked
his and other detainees' fates to international criminal law and set in motion
nearly a decade's long struggle by U.S. courts to resolve complex questions
of congressional power under the U.S. Constitution, the bounds of the laws
of war, and the contours of individual international criminal liability arising
under them.
Three years later, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan I), the U.S. Su-
preme Court agreed with Hamdan that the commissions violated the Geneva
Conventions but came one vote short of also holding that conspiracy was not
a recognized law-of-war offense (and thus outside the commissions' sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction).3 Although Justice Kennedy declined to reach the
question of the commission's jurisdiction over conspiracy, finding it unnec-
essary for the disposition of the case,4 the plurality unequivocally found
that, at least in the absence of statutory definition, there was no evidence
that conspiracy had ever constituted a recognized offense under the custom-
ary laws of war.'
Just four months later, Congress responded by exercising its constitu-
tional authority to "define and punish . . . offenses against the law of
1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan 1), 548 U.S. 557, 568-69 (2006).
2. Id. at 567.
3. Id. The laws of war are also frequently referred to as the law of armed conflict or
international humanitarian law, the latter of which is preferred in scholarly writing. I have
chosen to refer here to the laws of war to underscore the distinction between war crimes and
standard domestic criminality in hopes of alleviating some potential confusion.
4. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) ("I likewise see no need to address the
validity of the conspiracy charge against Hamdan-an issue addressed at length in Part V of
Justice Stevens' opinion . . . .").
5. Id. at 600 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he deficiencies in the time and place allegations
underscore . .. the most serious defect of this charge: The offense it alleges is not triable by
law-of-war military commission.").
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nations"6 (the Define and Punish Clause) and enacted the Military Commis-
sion Act (MCA) of 2006.1 The MCA codified thirty-two offenses,' including
conspiracy' and material support for terrorism,' 0 that would thereafter be
subject to trial by military commission." In enacting the legislation, Con-
gress provided that it was only codifying those offenses that had
"traditionally been triable by military commission" and was "not estab-
lish[ing] new crimes."l 2 Consequently, the MCA "does not preclude trial for
offenses that occurred before the date of [its] enactment." 3 In what surely
must have produced a sense of d6ja vu, Hamdan came once again before the
military commissions on charges of conspiracy as well as the newly estab-
lished offense of providing material support for terrorism in United States v.
Hamdan (Hamdan I1).14 Once again, Hamdan contended that, irrespective of
the new statutory provision, both of these effectively inchoate offenses 5
were not violations of the customary international laws of war, and thus that
the military commissions still lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.' 6 Parallel
to his case, another detainee, Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul, made a
nearly identical argument on appeal from nearly identical charges.' 7 In
2011, the Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) unanimously
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
7. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2625 (codified
as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 950t (2011)). The statute was amended in 2009 by Pub. L. No.
111-84, 123 Stat. 2574 (2009), but those amendments did not alter the statutory offense provi-
sions discussions here.
8. 10 U.S.C. § 950t.
9. Id. § 950t(29).
10. Id. § 950t(25).
11. Id. The Military Commission Act (MCA) subjects those offenses to trial by military
commission only when they are committed by "alien unlawful enemy combatants." Id. § 948c.
Separate statutes in the domestic criminal code govern similar offenses committed by U.S. cit-
izens and make those offenses subject to traditional federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 2331 (2011).
12. 10 U.S.C. § 950p(d).
13. Id.
14. United States v. Hamdan (Hamdan II), 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en
banc), rev'd, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
15. See infra Part EII.A. However, the Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR)
does not recognize these offenses as inchoate. United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F Supp. 2d
1141, 1203 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc), rev'd, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curi-
am).
16. Defense Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Ex Post
Facto Charges at 1, Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (No. 43439-0001).
17. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1158. Al Bahlul, whose conduct primarily comprised
making a public relations, or recruitment, video, is also charged with solicitation. Id. He is
challenging this charge on First Amendment grounds as well, id., although that argument is
not discussed in this Note.
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rebuffed both defenses;" both defendants in turn filed appeals with the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals.19 In one unanimous and comparatively succinct
opinion, a panel of the D.C. Circuit overturned Hamdan's conviction for ma-
terial support, finding that it was not a recognized international law-of-war
offense; however, it avoided the constitutional questions by resting its hold-
ing on statutory restrictions on the commissions' jurisdiction. 20 Three
months later, another panel, in a brief per curiam opinion, vacated both Al
Bahlul's material support and conspiracy convictions, finding that result
compelled under their decision in Hamdan II.21 Although the government
declined to directly appeal Hamdan 11,22 it has since filed a petition for re-
hearing en banc in Al Bahlul in which it argues that Hamdan II should be
reversed.23
Although the degree of deference U.S. courts will ultimately grant Con-
gress to define the laws of war under the Define and Punish Clause remains
an open question, the CMCR has at least attempted to make an independent
determination of international law rather than signing off on a blank check
to Congress to create such crimes out of whole cloth.24 In contrast, the D.C.
Circuit avoided the question and limited its cursory international law analy-
sis to treaty law, adding no clarity to the matter despite reaching the
opposite conclusion.25 Such interpretive struggles are not limited to the mili-
tary commissions, nor are they rendered moot by the D.C. Circuit's
opinions. The D.C. Circuit's statute-based holding appeared to invite prose-
18. Id. at 1158-59; Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1254. In both cases the CMCR sat en
banc; thus, I refer to the CMCR as a singular entity throughout this Note rather than distin-
guishing the panels. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1153; Hamdan II, 801 F Supp. 2d at 1253.
19. Brief of Petitioner at 40-42, Al Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner in Al Bahlul], 2012 WL 761316, at *40--42; Brief
of Petitioner Salim Ahmed Hamdan at 48-50, Hamdan v. United States (Hamdan II), 696 F3d
1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1257) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner in Hamdan II], 2011 WL
5569434, at *48-50. The MCA establishes exclusive jurisdiction in the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals for all appeals of final judgments arising from the military commissions. 10 U.S.C.
§ 950g(a) (2011).
20. Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
21. Al Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam).
22. Wells Bennett, No USG Appeal in Hamdan; Stay Tuned for al-Bahlul, LAWFARE
BLOG (Jan. 18, 2013, 11:22 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/01/no-usg-appeal-in-
hamdan-stay-tuned-for-al-bahlul.
23. Petition of the United States for Rehearing En Banc, Al Bahlul, No. 11-1324 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 5, 2013).
24. United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F Supp. 2d 1141, 1169-73 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en
banc) (reviewing U.S. jurisprudence on the scope of the Define and Punish Clause and
adopting the "substantial showing" requirement declared by the Hamdan I plurality), rev'd,
No. I1-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam).
25. Hamdan II, 696 E3d at 1250-53. However, writing only for himself, Judge Ka-
vanaugh explained in a footnote that he would find that Congress has substantial authority to
define new crimes and subject them to military commission jurisdiction under its Article I,
Section 8 powers, including its war powers, even where they had not crystallized in a custom-
ary international law offense. Id. at 1246, n.6.
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cutions for material support for conduct arising after 2006.26 Moreover, as-
suming that the decisions are ultimately upheld, international law may well
play a role in defining other theories of liability against detainees; indeed,
the Chief Prosecutor, in announcing the withdrawal of inchoate conspiracy
charges in United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (the 9/11 case), reaf-
firmed that he did so while retaining conspiracy as a theory of liability for
substantive offenses "in a manner that has been upheld in military law, fed-
eral law, and international law under the doctrine of 'joint criminal
enterprise.' "27 However, if the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Hamdan II re-
quires that any pre-2006 conduct prosecuted be a crime as a matter of
international law, 28 prosecutors could face challenges in some cases if they
attempt to bring a conspiracy charge for particularly attenuated conduct on a
theory of joint criminal enterprise (JCE). These persistent concerns, and the
clearly intertwined nature of the war on terror and international criminal
law, underscore the need for coherence in this arena.
In rendering this interpretive analysis, the courts confront a substantially
more complex and ambiguous body of international law than in their earlier
determinations of congressional authority under the Define and Punish
Clause. 29 In its Al Bahlul and Hamdan II opinions, the CMCR engaged in
substantial analysis of a variety of dubious, if not outright inapposite,
sources to hold that both conspiracy and material support are cognizable
law-of-war violations and thus triable by military commission. 30 On appeal,
the D.C. Circuit avoided the issue.3 1 As the federal courts weed out those ir-
relevant sources, they will be left with primary recourse to international
criminal law (ICL) in the form of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC),32 judgments by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the tribunal's theory of JCE.33
26. See id. at 1241 n.1, 1246.
27. Wells Bennett, Chief Prosecutor Statement on This Week's Hearing in the 9/11
Case, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 28, 2013, 3:26 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/01/chief-
prosecutor-statement-on-this-weeks-hearing-in-the-911-casel.
28. Hamdan II, 696 F3d at 1248 nn.8-9; id. at 1248-49 ("The 'law of war' referenced
in 10 U.S.C. § 821 is the international law of war.").
29. See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887) (holding that counterfeiting
was a recognized offense against the law of nations); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 184, 185 (1820) (holding that Congress had exceeded its authority by trying to statu-
torily define murder as piracy, the latter of which was a recognized offense against the law of
nations).
30. See United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1227, rev'd, No. 11-1324
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam); Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1279 (C.M.C.R.
2011) (en banc), rev'd, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
31. Hamdan II, 696 F.3d at 1250-53.
32. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
33. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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While the CMCR cited the ICTY's jurisprudence and the Rome Statute
as validating the cognizability of the material-support offense,34 neither the
ICTY nor the ICC has ever exercised jurisdiction over "terrorism" per se, let
alone inchoate offenses one step removed. Indeed, the delegates to the Rome
Conference failed to agree on the inclusion of terrorism as a distinct offense,
and an array of scholars have rejected any notion that "terrorism" as distinct
from the traditional panoply of war crimes could fall within the ICC's juris-
diction.35 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit made only conclusory reference to the
absence of "material support" in international treaties and tribunal statutes,
further commenting that it was not a recognized customary international law
offense, nor had anyone ever been prosecuted for it, without citation.3 6 The
paradoxical nature of the CMCR's logic, the nature of the ICC and ICTY as
two of the few valid and inescapable authorities on criminal liability for
law-of-war violations, and the initial reference by all parties to the ICTY's
JCE theory of liability ensure that the federal courts will continue to contend
with this issue.37 Additionally, three circuit courts of appeal have recently
debated the respective authoritative status of the Rome Statute vis-A-vis the
ICTY's jurisprudence; they have split on the proper authority to accord
these sources when interpreting customary international law norms. 38 This
split is indicative of the larger dilemma facing courts and scholars over what
authority to grant this body of largely judge-made international criminal law
that does not fit nicely within formal doctrinal parameters.
34. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1210-14; Hamdan II, 801 F Supp. 2d at 1284-88.
35. See, e.g., Eric Bales, Torturing the Rome Statute: The Attempt to Bring Guantana-
mo's Detainees Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 16 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 173, 185 (2009); Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the
Role of the International Criminal Court As a Legal Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 13, 14 (2003); Thomas Weigend, The Universal Terrorist: The International Communi-
ty Grappling with a Definition, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 912, 914 (2006). Terrorism has
historically undergone disparate national treatment and has frequently been addressed as a
domestic criminal law matter, as in the case of the Irish Republic Army in Northern Ireland or
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain. Consequently, there is no agreed-upon definition of terror-
ism, a primary reason for why it was not included, and indeed rejected, in the jurisdiction of
the Rome Statute. Although terrorism, when understood as the prohibited targeting of the ci-
vilian population during an armed conflict, could be tried as a war crime, "'[t]errorism' is not
a legal notion. It is much more a combination of policy goals, propaganda and violent
acts-an amalgam of measures to achieve an objective." Hans-Peter Gasser, Acts of Terror
"Terrorism" and International Humanitarian Law, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 547, 552-54
(2002); see also ADRIAN GUELKE, THE AGE OF TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITI-
CAL SYSTEM 8 (1995); BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 13-14 (1999).
36. Hamdan II, 696 E3d at 1250-53.
37. In fact, Justice Stevens for the plurality in Hamdan I appeared to reject a joint crim-
inal enterprise liability (JCE) analogy to support the cognizability of a conspiracy charge. See
Hamdan I, 548 U.S. 557, 611 n.40 (2006).
38. Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F3d 388, 400 (4th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
654 E3d 11, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582
F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 E3d 254, 276 (2d
Cir. 2007) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028
(2008); see discussion infra Part IV.B.
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The issue presented by Hamdan's appeal-whether a recognized war
criminal's driver may be tried for war crimes on the theory that his driving
contributed to the crimes-brings to the fore dilemmas posed by modem
developments in international law. Defying public international law's anach-
ronistic statist origins and formal doctrine of sources,3 9 the last two decades
have witnessed the rapid evolution of law driven not by states, but by inter-
national and nongovernmental organizations and international courts.40 This
"judicialization"41 of international law is nowhere more evident than in ICL,
a body of law that, in reality, has been almost wholly developed by interna-
tional tribunals.4 2 Although rooted in a handful of mid-twentieth-century
treaties elaborating the laws of war, much of the substance of ICL has been
articulated, expanded, and, frankly, revolutionized by the ad hoc tribunals. 43
Nevertheless, judge-made law remains formally anathema to an internation-
al legal system still governed by a statist doctrine of sources that rejects the
ability of courts and judges to make law.' Previously a matter of abstract
theory for scholars, this paradox is rendered concrete by the cases of
Hamdan, Al Bahlul, and other detainees whose futures appear to rely on the
substantive and authoritative limitations placed on these juridical sources.
This Note will examine theoretical problems in ICL and public
international law by evaluating the practical implications of applying ICL
sources to find criminal liability outside the narrow confines of the
international tribunals. It will examine the problems posed by the conflicting
standards of the Rome Statute and ICTY jurisprudence as a matter of
customary international law, the failure of U.S. courts to effectively confront
the contextual and doctrinal analysis necessary to determine the limitations
of these sources, and the proper application of these sources to the issues
raised in Hamdan II and Al Bahlul.4 5 Viewing ICL through the lens of public
39. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; see Harlan G. Cohen, International Law's Erie Mo-
ment, 34 MICH. J. INT'L L. 249, 253 (2013).
40. Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly, Introduction to JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 1, 1-2 (Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 2010); see
Cohen, supra note 39, at 250-51.
41. Cohen, supra note 39, at 251.
42. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International
Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1, 46 (2006); Darcy & Powder-
ly, supra note 40.
43. See Danner, supra note 42, at 46; Darcy & Powderly, supra note 40, at 1-2, 32.
References to the ad hoc tribunals are to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Importantly,
the ICTY and ICTR share an Appeals Chamber. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), PROJECT ON INT'L CTs. & TRIBUNALS, http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ICTR.html
(last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
44. See infra Part IV.D.
45. See Brief for the United States at 23-24, 38-39, Al Bahlul v. United States, No. I 1-
1324 (D.C. Cir. May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Brief for the United States in Al Bahlul], 2012 WL
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international law's doctrine of sources highlights the challenges inherent to
such an analysis and underscores the tangible consequences of leaving these
challenges unaddressed in the cases of Hamdan and Al Bahlul.4 6 Although
this Note is driven principally from a review of (and concern with) U.S.
courts' treatment of ICL, the very problems identified in domestic attempts
at interpretation implicate broader issues regarding the evolution of ICL
within the confines of public international law's archaic, formal system.
These issues are exemplified by the way the CMCR has imported and
applied JCE-a controversial, nascent theory of liability-while severing it
from its factual and policy origins. The CMCR's analysis of ICL is troubling
not only for its serious inconsistencies with the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
tribunals but also for the concerns it raises for the international community
more broadly about the repercussions of adopting ICL judicial precedents
uncritically.
This Note examines three issues in the wake of Hamdan II and Al
Bahlul: (1) whether material support is properly analogous to JCE; (2)
whether, as a matter of formal public international law, U.S. courts have
properly interpreted the authority of the ICTY's jurisprudence vis-A-vis the
Rome Statute in defining and identifying customary international law
norms; and (3) whether the importation of these ICL sources for the purpos-
es of the military commission is proper given the unique context of the
tribunals and what, if any, restraints should be placed on the use of their
doctrinal developments. The Note proceeds to address these issues as fol-
lows: Part I provides a short background to contextualize the cases of
Hamdan and Al Bahlul, the U.S. constitutional limits that frame their legal
challenges, and the CMCR's and D.C. Circuit's attempts to identify custom-
ary international law norms through a variety of sources. Part II summarizes
the development of JCE at the ICTY as well as the ICC's recent decisions
appearing to reject JCE liability as a matter of statute. Part III examines the
CMCR's attempt to analogize material support to JCE in order to establish it
as a recognized offense against the customary laws of war. Part IV situates
the ICTY and ICC jurisprudence within a public international law frame-
work by looking to the doctrine of sources and the intercircuit debate on the
nature and authority of these sometimes-contradictory ICL sources. Finally,
the Note concludes by suggesting normative concerns that should inform the
use and application of ICL doctrinal developments and by offering some ini-
tial suggestions for ways to delineate the boundaries of ICL to prevent its
unmitigated expansion into contexts in which it was never envisioned to ap-
ply.
1743629, at *23-24, *38-39; Brief for the United States at 18, Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. I1-1257), 2012 WL 136259, at *18.
46. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of
Sources, 93 IowA L. REv. 65, 74 (2007).
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1. THE INTERNATIONAL LAw FOUNDATION OF MILITARY
COMMISSION JURISDICTION
A. Domestic Authority for Military Commissions
In the United States, military commissions act as an exception to tradi-
tional federal courts.47 As an exception, military commissions as a U.S.
constitutional matter have historically been understood to possess jurisdic-
tion as substitutes for civilian courts in three instances: (1) during martial
law, (2) in occupied enemy territory, or (3) as "an incident ... of war" to try
"enemies who ... have violated the law of war," usually on the battlefield.48
Because the facts would not support, and the government has not alleged, a
jurisdictional basis arising under the first two scenarios, the ability for the
military commissions to exercise jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees is
thus understood to be limited to the "law-of-war commission model."49 This
model purportedly derives from the customary laws of war and from Con-
gress's authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, 0
although the government presented a novel new argument on appeal that as-
serted a fourth model deriving from a domestic common law of war under
Congress's amalgamated war powers.5 ' Although the D.C. Circuit rejected
this argument as applied to Hamdan and Al Bahlul, it rooted its decision in
the lack of statutory authority prior to 2006 and the concomitant retroactivi-
ty concerns, thus leaving the constitutional question of Congress's authority
to prospectively "define" such crimes undecided. 52
47. The U.S. Constitution provides that the "judicial power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts" created by Congress that retain
constitutionally specified characteristics that are not possessed by military commissions. U.S.
CONsT. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. The ability to subject some offenses and offenders to military com-
missions or courts-martial is considered to be a result of various exceptions to this otherwise
exclusive federal judicial system. See Hamdan 1, 548 U.S. 557, 591, 596-98 (2006); Steven I.
Vladeck, The Laws of War As a Constitutional Constraint on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 295, 300-01 (2010).
48. Hamdan 1, 548 U.S. at 595-97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. See id. at 597 ("Since Guantanamo Bay is neither enemy-occupied territory nor un-
der martial law, the law-of-war commission is the only model available.").
50. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see Vladeck, supra note 47, at 316, 319 (reviewing
primary U.S. case law on the subject).
51. Although the law-of-war commission model has traditionally required courts to lo-
cate law-of-war offenses in international law, in its appellate briefs and oral argument to the
D.C. Circuit in Hamdan II and Al Bahlul, the U.S. government appeared to drop any pretense
of arguing that offenses such as material support to terrorism or conspiracy constitute interna-
tional law-of-war violations. Instead, they advanced the novel argument that there exists a
heretofore-unknown "domestic common law of war," violations of which may also be tried
before military commissions regardless of their link to customary international law-of-war of-
fenses. Brief for the United States in Al Bahlul, supra note 45, at 38-39. This theory asks the
courts to determine that Congress may subject such offenses to the purview of military com-
missions pursuant to its amalgamated war powers rather than the explicit "define and punish"
clause. Vladeck, supra note 47, at 330.
52. See Handan I, 696 F.3d 1238, 1241 n.1, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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The issue of the limitations on Congress's power in this regard5 3 re-
mains one that the military commissions themselves have either ignored or
misconstrued.5 4 For the purposes of this Note, it is essential to distinguish
between Congress's ability to criminalize the conduct constituting material
support as a domestic criminal law matter (triable before traditional federal
courts) and its ability to subject that criminal conduct to the purview of mili-
tary commissions as a violation of the laws of war." This latter power has
traditionally required that the subject-matter jurisdiction of military com-
missions originate in the laws of war, a subset of the law of nations.5 6
Because the explicit grant of power to Congress in the Define and Punish
Clause is by reference to international law, Hamdan and Al Bahlul have con-
tended that the offenses they have been charged with-inchoate conspiracy
and material support for terrorism"-have no analogues in the laws of war.
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution-which allows Congress to "de-
fine and punish offenses against the law of nations" 58-has added some
ambiguity to this analysis, as neither the constitutional clause nor the courts
describe whether this constraint is one that permits Congress merely to rec-
ognize or in fact to newly elaborate international offenses. 9 However, as
Justice Stevens noted in Hamdan I, absent Congress's attempt to define such
an international law violation by statute, the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the military commissions must rest on "a substantial showing" of a violation
of the customary laws of war at the time they were committed.60 Both
defendants hence also contended that even if Congress may prospectively
proscribe such conduct by statute, the Ex Post Facto Clause61 and its ICL
53. See George P. Fletcher, Hamdan Confronts the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 427, 438 (2007); Vladeck, supra note 47, at 329-34.
54. See infra Part I.B.1.
55. See Fletcher, supra note 53, at 440.
56. See Hamdan 1, 548 U.S. 557, 601 (2006); United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp.
2d 1141, 1169 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc) ("The parties agree the constitutional authority 'To
define and punish Offences against the Law of Nations' . . . provides Congress a basis to es-
tablish a statutory framework, such as the 2006 M.C.A., for trying and punishing violations of
the law of war."), rev'd, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam); Hamdan II, 801
F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1312, 1314 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc), rev'd, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
57. Both Hamdan's and Al Bahlul's charges are inchoate in that they do not include an
underlying completed offense. Rather, like Pinkerton conspiracy liability in the United States,
these charges reflect a legislative determination that this conduct-irrespective of a link to a
completed offense, such as a specific terrorist attack-should be considered criminal, regard-
less of whether it can be linked to another harm. See infra Part III; see also Pinkerton v.
United States, 38 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946).
58. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (emphasis added).
59. See Vladeck, supra note 47, at 329-34.
60. Hamdan 1, 548 U.S. at 603 ("At a minimum, the Government must make a substan-
tial showing that the crime for which it seeks to try a defendant by military commission is
acknowledged to be an offense against the law of war.").
61. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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corollary-nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law, or the principle
of legality)-require that such conduct be recognized as a violation at the
time the conduct occurred.62 Since Congress's first attempt to statutorily
"define" material support as a law-of-war violation did not occur until 2006,
nearly five years after both Hamdan and Al Bahlul were detained,63 the
MCA is largely inapplicable. This did not stop the government from pro-
ceeding to trial on the statutory charges, based on its statutory assertion that
the codified offenses were cognizable prior to statutory enactment." By
challenging Congress's ability to subject either conspiracy or material sup-
port65 to military commission jurisdiction, both lawsuits could substantially
alter the basis on which the government may try remaining and future de-
tainees.6
B. The Courts'Search for International Law
In attempting to identify material support's corollary in international
law, the D.C. Circuit limited itself to a conclusory analysis that appeared to
be largely defined by whether the precise term "material support"-rather
than analogous conduct or liability-was formally recognized in interna-
tional law.67 In determining that neither relevant treaties nor customary
international law recognized material support for terrorism as a war crime, it
cited only to the the primary treaties governing the laws of war and the stat-
utes for various international criminal tribunals. 68 Although adding that no
international court had found material support to be a war crime nor did
leading commentators support the claim, it failed to cite to or examine any
international precedent. 69
62. Brief of Petitioner in Al Bahlul, supra note 19, at 40-42; Brief of Petitioner in
Hamdan II, supra note 19, at 48-52. For a discussion on the modem adoption of the principle
of legality in ICL, see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 43-44 (2d ed.
2008); BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 914 (2d ed. 2010).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
64. See 10 U.S.C. § 950p(d) (2011).
65. Because conspiracy has been previously addressed, this Note focuses primarily on
material support. However, as discussed below, the two offenses operate similarly, and both
defendants challenge the subject-matter jurisdiction over both charges on the same grounds.
See infra Part Ill.
66. See Petition of the United States for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 23, at 14 (argu-
ing that rehearing is particularly important because of the use of conspiracy and material
support charges "in all of the military commission cases to date that have resulted in convici-
tions, as well as the pending prosecutions of defendants charged with participation in the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole").
67. See Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238, 1250-53 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
68. Id.
69. Id. Notably, the court relied on its Hamdan II analysis to vacate all of Al Bahlul's
convictions, including for conspiracy and solicitation. Al Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam). Yet its opinion in Hamdan II does not so much as refer-
ence World War 1-era precedent that arguably provides a stronger case for conspiracy. The
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In contrast, the CMCR analyzed a diverse array of international sources,
most of them of questionable relevance to the issue at hand: whether the
charged offenses were cognizable violations of the customary international
laws of war. Given the relative clarity of the issues presented by the appel-
lants (and indeed by the Hamdan I plurality), the CMCR's reframing of this
issue portended the problematic analysis that ensued. In a troubling and su-
perficial engagement with the questions, the CMCR asserted, "Our focus
here is on whether the international community considered Appellant's ac-
tions to be criminally punishable.""o It then proceeded to evidence this
general criminal culpability by reference to an amalgamation of disparate
sources without regard to their status as a matter of international law, let
alone the laws of war specifically." Nevertheless, its analysis provides a
framework for assessing whether material support possesses some interna-
tional support in substance, if not in form.
1. Foreign Law
First, the CMCR cited examples of domestic criminal laws of three for-
eign jurisdictions. 72 However, just as U.S. domestic criminal law does not
evidence international law, neither do the statutes of foreign jurisdictions. As
leading national security law scholar Robert Chesney quipped, "Let's as-
sume, for example, that just about every country in the world criminalizes
car theft. We would not claim that car theft also violates the law of nations,
let alone the laws of war."73 Domestic criminality is irrelevant to the primary
question before the court, which is the need to distinguish this type of tradi-
tional criminal culpability from liability arising under the laws of war.
This survey of foreign law is all the more perplexing because the court
did not even purport to frame it as an international law inquiry that seeks,
lack of interpretative analysis in Hamdan II may be due to the government's concession that
material support was not recognized under customary international law, see Hamdan II, 696
F3d at 1251, as well as to the fact that the holding was a statutory, rather than constitutional,
one, thus leaving Congress an open door.
70. Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1285 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc) (emphasis add-
ed), rev'd, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
71. Id. at 1288 ("It is the duty of this court to ascertain whether appellant's conduct,
providing material support for terrorism, constituted an offense against the law of nations. In
doing so, we apply the definition of terrorism [in the MCA] and we consider the degree to
which appellant's underlying conduct violated international standards defining crimes as
shown by various national laws prohibiting terrorism.").
72. Id. at 1288-92 (discussing laws in Canada, India, and Pakistan). The court also ref-
erenced three secondary sources for the proposition that "[s]ome nations have had prohibitions
against offenses involving criminal organizations for many years" without explaining how any
of the laws cited supported the MCA's criminalization of material support for terrorism. See
id. at 1289 & n.89.
73. Robert Chesney, Understanding the CMCR's Hamdan Opinion, LAWFARE BLOG




for example, to identify a general principle of international law. Although
one valid source of international law may be "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations,"74 as the ICTY Appeals Chamber recog-
nized in its own similar analysis of war crimes liability,
national legislation and case law cannot be relied upon as a source
of international principles or rules, under the doctrine of the general
principles of law recognized by the nations of the world: for this re-
liance to be permissible, it would be necessary to show that most, if
not all, countries adopt the same notion of common purpose. More
specifically, it would be necessary to show that, in any case, the ma-
jor legal systems of the world take the same approach to this notion.
The above brief survey shows that this is not the case... .In the ar-
ea under discussion, domestic law does not originate from the
implementation of international law but rather, to a large extent,
runs parallel to and precedes international regulation.15
In part the CMCR's analysis may be informed by the court's confusion
as to the role international law is meant to play in determining its jurisdic-
tion. In an early passage of its Hamdan H opinion, the court engaged in a
page-long analysis of why customary international law does not and cannot
trump a subsequently adopted domestic statute.76 It thus appeared to be
treating the defense's argument as asking the court to view international law
as a restraint on Congress's otherwise-constitutional power.77 Yet interna-
tional law is not a separate restraint on, but instead the source (by way of the
Define and Punish Clause) of, congressional authority in this context. Con-
gress can, of course, pass statutes discordant with the law of nations, but not
with the Constitution.
2. Treaty Law
This propensity for conflating states' domestic criminalization of
analogous conduct with law-of-war liability informed the CMCR's second
evidentiary source: international conventions. The majority of conventions
cited by the CMCR are multilateral suppression treaties unrelated to the
laws of war.78 Rather, such treaties on the suppression of terrorist bombings
and the financing of terrorism oblige the signatories to address terrorism
through their respective domestic criminal laws.79 The D.C. Circuit
74. ICJ Statute, supra note 39, art. 38(c).
75. Prosecutor v. Tadid (Tadid Appeals Judgement), Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement,
1225 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
76. See Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1268-69.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1281 & n.59.
79. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terror-
ism art. 4(1), opened for signature Jan. 10, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13,075, 2178 U.N.T.S 197;
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recognized as much on appeal.so If anything, such treaties underscore an
international consensus that terrorism is primarily the concern of domestic
law enforcement, undercutting rather than supporting military commission
jurisdiction."' The CMCR also referenced several relevant treaties, namely
the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, Genocide Convention, and
Rome Statute.82 Yet although these treaties comprise the backbone of
relevant positive law and inform the ad hoc tribunals' subject-matter
jurisdiction, the CMCR was content to treat them only cursorily, perhaps
recognizing that there is nothing analogous in this fount of the laws of war
that would support the court's ultimate determination.83 For example, the
CMCR failed to cite the actual offenses detailed by the conventions, none of
which are inchoate, and none of which correspond to material support.Y The
CMCR ignored the inclusion of conspiracy in the Genocide Convention
entirely in Hamdan II but cited it as supportive for inchoate war crimes
conspiracy charges in Al Bahlul." Notably, the Genocide Convention's
conspiracy provision is unique to that convention and has been understood
to be "the exception that proves the rule" against recognizing similar
inchoate liability for other international crimes deriving from the Hague and
Geneva Conventions.86 Moreover, genocide is not inherently a war crime
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings art 4(1), opened for signa-
ture Jan. 12, 1998, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-6 (2002), 2149 U.N.T.S. 256.
80. Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
81. See Chesney, supra note 73.
82. Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1281-82; see Rome Statute, supra note 32; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609;
Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
(II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (111)
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 278; Hague Convention
(IV) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 32 Stat. 1803, 205
Consol. T.S. 277. The Rome Statute will be addressed in detail below. See infra Part II.B.
83. See United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1175-79 (C.M.C.R. 2011)
(en banc) (discussing the conventions in the context of determining whether it has proper
personal jurisdiction over an alien unlawful enemy combatant but not in determining
subject-matter jurisdiction for the alleged offenses), rev'd, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25,
2013) (per curiam); Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1281-82, 1310.
84. See Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1190-1230; Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1280-
85.
85. See Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1216; Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1280-85.
86. Raha Wala, Note, From Guantanamo to Nuremberg and Back: An Analysis of Con-
spiracy to Commit War Crimes Under International Humanitarian Law, 41 GEo. J. INT'L L.
683, 705 (2010).
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and requires no nexus to an armed conflict, rendering it of little relevance to
determining war crimes jurisdiction.7
3. War Crimes Tribunals
Finally, the CMCR made its first foray into ICL, citing to U.S. military
tribunals dating from the Civil War, the London Charter and cases arising
under both the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and National Military
Tribunals that followed World War II (WWII),88 and the ICTY 89 This Note
is not concerned with the domestic-war-tribunal analysis of the Civil War
era: the precedent from these tribunals is murky at best in that the proffered
cases often involved tribunals exercising multiple forms of jurisdiction sim-
ultaneously and thus are not strong precedent for military commissions
operating only under law-of-war jurisdiction.90 To the extent that they repre-
sent U.S. practice under the laws of war, they remain insufficient to establish
international custom without substantial evidence of other states' similar
practice.
As to the WWII precedents, there has been a proliferation of recent
scholarship on the correct interpretation of some of the more controversial
forms of liability employed during the post-WWII trials.9' A review of that
scholarship here would be redundant and tangential to this Note's central
concern since WWII-era jurisprudence has largely been subsumed by mod-
ern ICL developments. Briefly, the CMCR offered a handful of select trials
as evidence of international liability for conduct analogous to material sup-
port during the Nuremberg prosecutions.92 This evidence stemmed primarily
from the inclusion in the London Charter (which established the IMT) of
conspiracy liability and the offense of criminal organizational
87. Yves Sandoz, Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law, in 1 INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: SOURCES, SUBJECTS, AND CONTENTS 308 (M. Cherif Bassiuoni ed.,
3rd ed. 2008).
88. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-10, 1238-39; Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d at
1304-09.
89. Al Bahlul, 820 F Supp. 2d at 1213; Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
90. Hamdan 1, 548 U.S. 557, 603-04, 608 (2006); Vladeck, supra note 47, at 312-22,
328 (reviewing seminal cases from the Civil War era).
91. See KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 275-94 (2011); Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Cor-
porations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109
COLUM. L. REv. 1094 (2009); Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associa-
tions: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 113-16 (2005) (discussing the response to
the United States' proposal to include organizational membership and conspiracy liability in
the London Charter and the eventual limitation of those provisions by the International Mili-
tary Tribunal [IMT]); Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11
CHI. J. INT'L L. 693 (2010); Wala, supra note 86.
92. Ohlin, supra note 91, at 707-08; Wala, supra note 86, at 690.
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membership.93 The history in this area has lent itself to selective citation,
and much confusion appears to derive from the conflation of the negotia-
tions over and ultimate inclusion of certain provisions in the London Charter
by the Allies and the judicial interpretation, criticism, and ultimate
limitations of those provisions imposed by the IMT. In fact, the IMT largely
rejected the attempt to use expansive inchoate offenses or conspiracy as a
form of liability,94 and it read the conspiracy theory of liability to apply only
to crimes of aggression and not to either war crimes or crimes against hu-
manity."
Although recognized as an authoritative pronouncement on the law at
the time, the London Charter was a multilateral treaty that has been
subsequently reinterpreted and reapplied, and much of the subsequent
history of ICL is viewed as repudiating the attempt by the Allied powers to
impose such broad forms of criminal liability.96 Neither the Nuremberg
Principles drafted at the request of the U.N. General Assembly nor the
International Law Commission's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace
and Security of Mankind include inchoate conspiracy or criminal-
organization membership as war crimes, nor do they include any other
inchoate offense for war crimes. 97 In fact, the comments to the Draft Code
clarify that the Article 2 provision that nominally refers to direct
participation in "planning or conspiring to commit such a crime which in
fact occurs"98 requires actual participation in forming the criminal plan. The
comments further clarify that the provision was "intended to ensure that
high-level government officials or military commanders ... are held
accountable for the major role that they play which is often a decisive factor
93. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-04; Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1306 (stating
that it was "clear that the concept of organizational guilt" included in the London Charter's
provisions and the subsequent trials of members before the National Military Tribunals "is
similar to providing material support to terrorism").
94. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 91, at 119; Fletcher, supra note 53, at 448; Wa-
la, supra note 86, at 705.
95. STEVEN R. RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 141 (3d ed. 2009); Danner & Mar-
tinez, supra note 91, at 116.
96. See Fletcher, supra note 53, at 448; Wala, supra note 86, at 692, 695-97, 702-04.
Interestingly, in its admittedly brief review of international law sources that could support ma-
terial support as a war crime in international law, the D.C. Circuit did not even mention the
IMT or London Charter, despite the fact that the Charter's organizational membership charges
would seem to be the best precedent for material. See Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238, 1249-52
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
97. Formulation of the Nimberg Principles, in Report of the International Law Com-
mission Covering Its Second Session, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316
(1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 YB. Int'l L. Comm'n 374, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1; Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind, in Report of the International Law Commission on Its Forty-Eighth Session, 51 U.N.
GAOR Supp No. 10, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) [1996] 2 YB. Int'l L. Comm'n 17, art.
2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part Two) [hereinafter Draft Code of Crimes].
98. Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 97, art. 2(3)(e) (emphasis added).
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in the commission of the crimes," while participation by midlevel and low-
level 'actors who carry out the plan is subject to other distinct liability
provisions.99
Finally, the jurisprudence of the subsequent international criminal tribu-
nals has largely subsumed and consolidated any international legal
precedent originating from the WWII tribunals. The ad hoc tribunals in turn
have explicitly rejected any form of inchoate offense while adopting a newly
formed doctrine of broad vicarious liability: JCE.
II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. The ICTY and the Development of JCE
What remains of the CMCR's sources is modem ICL precedent, includ-
ing the judgments of the ICTY and, to a lesser extent, the Rome Statute.100 It
is precisely the absence of other relevant sources, the rarity of law-of-war
prosecutions,o'0 and the wealth of jurisprudence on individual criminal lia-
bility in the context of armed conflict that renders the ICTY judgments
unquestionably important. The United Nations established the tribunal under
its Chapter VII powers in the midst of the war following the dissolution of
the former Yugoslavia.102 The ICTY's organic statute-which prescribes its
jurisdictional boundaries-was left to the U.N. Secretary-General.' 03 His re-
port provides a summary of the major treaties that elaborate the primary
rules of war that formed the basis of the Nuremberg prosecutions as well as
the post-WWII Nuremberg Principles and the International Law Commis-
sion Draft Code.10
The substantive offenses triable by the ICTY-grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity-
are listed in Articles 2 through 5 of the statute.' Additionally, Article 1
limits the ICTY to the prosecution of "serious violations of international
99. Id. art. 2, cmt. 14 (emphasis added).
100. Because of limited jurisprudence from the International Criminal Court (ICC) thus
far, most references have relied on the Rome Statute. However, two recent decisions contradict
initial assumptions about the Rome Statute's liability provisions, as discussed infra Part H.B.
101. Danner, supra note 42, at 46.
102. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
103. Id.; U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph
2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 31, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [herein-
after Rep. of the Secretary-General].
104. Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 103, 35. The reference to each category
of crimes is explicitly made with reference to these treaties. Id. The Secretary-General also
referenced the IMT Charter, id.; however, that reference-as indicated in the ICTY statute-
does not extend to any reference to the criminal-organization-membership provisions of the
IMT Charter. Statute of the International Tribunal art. 12, in Rep. of the Secretary-General,
supra note 103, Annex [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
105. ICTY Statute, supra note 104, arts. 2-5.
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humanitarian law." 06 Since neither the tribunal's statute nor any judgment
explicitly recognizes conspiracy, material support, or any other inchoate of-
fense for war crimes, U.S. courts have sought recourse in analogy to the
tribunal's theory of JCE liability.' Article 7(1) of the ICTY statute elabo-
rates the modes of individual responsibility for a crime within the tribunal's
jurisdiction, providing that "[a] person who planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or
execution of a crime ... shall be individually responsible for the crime." 08
Although appearing nowhere in the text of the ICTY's statute, the tribu-
nal identified JCE as an additional mode of responsibility in its first merits
case.'" The Trial Chamber was presented with charges against Dusko Tadi6,
a member of an armed group of Serbs in the Prijedor region of Bosnia.110
Tadid had actively participated in an operation to ethnically cleanse the town
of Jaskici; during that operation, five Bosniak males were killed."' The
question before the Trial Chamber was whether Tadid could be held liable
for their deaths even if it could not be determined whether he physically
struck the fatal blows." 2 Although ultimately convicting Tadid of eleven of
thirty-three counts involving charges of persecution, killing, rape, and other
inhumane treatment, the Trial Chamber found the defendant not guilty on
106. Id. art. 1.
107. In fact, in Al Bahlul, the CMCR en banc panel specified the following issue:
Assuming that [the charges alleged are violations of the law of war] and that "joint
criminal enterprise" is a theory of individual criminal liability under the law of
armed conflict, what, if any, impact does the "joint criminal enterprise" theory of
individual criminal liability have on this Court's determinations of whether [the
charges] constitute offenses triable by military commission and whether those
charges violate the Er Post Facto clause of the Constitution?
United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1158 n.1 1 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc), rev'd,
No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam). The inclusion of the specified issue is
oddly followed by a citation to a footnote in Hamdan I. That footnote to the plurality opinion
provided additional support for the assertion that conspiracy was not a violation of the law of
war, at least in its inchoate form. The footnote itself indicates that JCE liability is "a species of
liability for the substantive offense (akin to aiding and abetting), not a crime on its own" and
included a citation to ICTY jurisprudence explicitly distinguishing JCE from conspiracy.
Hamdan I, 548 U.S. 557, 611 n.40 (2006).
108. ICTY Statute, supra note 104, art. 7(1).
109. Technically, the first case resulting in a conviction was Prosecutor v. Erdemovid;
however, the defendant pled guilty and went directly to sentencing. Prosecutor v. Erdemovid,
Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgement, 13 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Nov. 29, 1996). Consequently, Tadid was the first case on the merits in both the Trial and Ap-
peals Chambers.
110. Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, 1 232 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
111. Prosecutor v. Tadid (Tadi6 Trial Judgement), Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and
Judgement, 342-372 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
112. Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 181.
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the five counts related to the deaths of the men in Jaskici.113 The Trial
Chamber concluded that while it could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Tadid entered Jaskici with a small group of armed men and beat a number of
the residents, it could not eliminate doubt as to who was responsible for the
deaths of five of those residents." 4 After the prosecution and the defense
cross-appealed the decision,"'5 the ICTY Appeals Chamber" 6 overturned the
ruling, finding that Tadid could be held liable for the five deaths, and pro-
ceeded to elaborate what is now termed the JCE theory of liability.' '7 It is
important to note at the outset that the phrase "joint criminal enterprise" can
cause some confusion due to the modem connotations of "enterprise" as an
entity such as an organization or company. Here, however, enterprise refers
to a form of collective action, project, or joint undertaking," 8 with the em-
phasis on a shared criminal intent. For example, as support for the existence
of extended JCE as a matter of customary international law, the ICTY cited
a number of cases at Nuremberg that focused on mob action." 9 In these in-
stances, it is not as though the individuals comprising the mob created a
formal organization with the goal of killing a soldier; rather, what mattered
was that they all formed a common intent to commit the crime and acted
collectively, resulting in a soldier's death. It is with this understanding that
JCE was defined as a theory of liability for collective action.
The Appeals Chamber first noted that from the facts, "the only reasona-
ble conclusion that the Trial Chamber could have drawn is that the armed
group to which [Tadi6] belonged killed the five men in Jaskici"l 20 and that
the essential issue was whether Tadid could be held liable for the murder of
the five men even though "there is no evidence that he personally killed any
of them."' 2 1 To answer this, the Appeals Chamber turned to the modes of li-
ability in the tribunal's statute and the accompanying Secretary-General's
113. Tadi6 Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 285.
114. Id. 1373.
115. In contrast to most common law jurisdictions, the ICTY is a fusion of common and
civil law practice and thus allows prosecutorial appeals of acquittals. Danner & Martinez, su-
pra note 91, at 78-79 & n.1.
116. The ICTY comprises three Trial Chambers and one Appeals Chamber. About the
ICTY: Chambers, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/141 (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). Either party
may have appeal on questions of law to the Appeals Chamber. ICTY Statute, supra note 104,
art. 25. The ICTY maintains seven appellate judges who sit by rotation in panels of five to
hear appeals. About the ICTY: Chambers, supra. Their judgments are binding on the Trial
Chambers in subsequent cases. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement,
911 89-114 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000).
117. Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94- 1-A, 227.
118. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines enterprise as, inter alia, "[a]
design of which the execution is attempted; a piece of work taken in hand, an
undertaking." Enterprise Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/
search?searchType=dictionary&q=enterprise&_searchBtn=Search (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
119. Tadie Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 1$ 204-215.
120. Id.9 183.
121. Id. 91 85 (emphasis added).
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Report, which underscored individual criminal responsibility as an "im-
portant element in relation to" the personal jurisdiction of the court.122 The
Appeals Chamber concluded that the statute could not possibly restrict the
notion of commission only to the physical perpetrator, for to do so would
exclude those modes of participating in the commission of crimes
which occur where several persons having a common purpose em-
bark on criminal activity that is then carried out either jointly or by
some members of this plurality of persons. Whoever contributes to
the commission of crimes by the group of persons or some mem-
bers of the group, in execution of a common criminal purpose, may
be held to be criminally liable, subject to certain conditions ....
[T]o hold criminally liable as a perpetrator only the person who
materially performs the criminal act would disregard the role as
co-perpetrators of all those who in some way made it possible for
the perpetrator to physically carry out that criminal act.123
In a lengthy discussion, the Appeals Chamber found that customary in-
ternational law recognized a theory of coperpetrator liability known as JCE
that existed in three classes-basic, systemic, and extended-each with dis-
tinct requirements.124 The actus reusl25 for each of the three classes of JCE is
the same, requiring (1) a plurality of persons; (2) a common plan, design, or
purpose among them to commit a crime within the tribunal's jurisdiction;
and (3) the accused's participation in that common plan to perpetrate the
crime.126 The common plan need not have been "previously arranged or
formulated ... [but] may materialise extemporaneously." 27 The manner of
participation need not be a separate criminal offense but rather "may take
the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common
plan."'28
122. Id. 186; Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 103, 53.
123. Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 11190, 192 (emphasis added).
124. Wala, supra note 86, at 706-07. Systemic JCE is understood to be particular to con-
centration camps or analogous organized systems of mistreatment and as such is not discussed
in depth here. See Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 1$ 202-203.
125. The act requirement is known in international law as the "objective elements."
Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 227.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. Compare Prosecutor v. Popovid, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgement (Vol. 1),
1026 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010) ("An accused may contrib-
ute to and further the common purpose of the JCE by various acts, which need not involve
carrying out any part of the actus reus of a crime forming part of the common purpose, or in-
deed any crime at all."), with Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on
Dragoljub Ojdanid's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-Joint Criminal Enterprise, 23 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003) ("[TJhe liability of a member of a joint
criminal enterprise will depend on the commission of criminal acts in furtherance of that en-
terprise.").
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The mens rea requirement,129 however, differs with the class of JCE
charged. In basic JCE, the accused must share the intent with his coperpetra-
tors "to perpetrate a certain crime." 30 Where the underlying crime has a
specific-intent element, the accused must share that specific intent.' 3 ' This
would be the case for genocide, for example, which requires intentionally
killing with the specific "intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group."l3 2 Under the second, or "systemic," class
of JCE, the accused must have both knowledge of and the intent to further a
system of ill treatment.'33 Liability under the third, or "extended," class of
JCE, however, may potentially arise for a crime other than the one agreed
upon. Such extended JCE liability requires that the accused (1) share the in-
tention to commit the original, planned crime; (2) foresee that this second
crime might be perpetrated by other members of the JCE; and (3) by partic-
ipating, "willingly [take] that risk." 34 "The crime must be shown to have
been foreseeable to the accused in particular."'
Tadid's culpability for the murders of the five Bosniak men is illustra-
tive of how extended JCE functions in practice. Tadid participated in the
armed conflict in the Prijedor region and "actively took part in the common
criminal purpose to rid the Prijedor region of the non-Serb population, by
committing inhumane acts." 36 "[I]n furtherance of this policy, inhumane
acts were committed against numerous victims and pursuant to a recognisa-
ble plan."37 Although killing the non-Serb population was not the criminal
purpose, "it is clear that killings frequently occurred," and that Tadi6 was
aware of them "is beyond doubt." 38 In that context, Tadid "was an armed
member of an armed group that. . . attacked Jaskici . .. rounding up and se-
verely beating some of the men" and could thus be held liable under JCE for
the deaths of the men without proof that he fired the fatal shots.'3"
Subsequent ICTY cases have further elaborated, if not further clarified,
various aspects of JCE in application. For example, while the tribunal must
"identify the plurality of persons belonging to the JCE," this does not
129. The mental state is also referred to as the "subjective elements" in international law.
Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1 -A, 194.
130. Id. 1228.
131. Popovi6, Case No. IT-05-88-T, 1022.
132. Id. 1022, n.3362; ICTY Statute, supra note 104, art. 4(2).
133. Tadic Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1 -A, 228.
134. Id. (emphasis omitted). The second category, systemic JCE, is reserved for concen-
tration camp cases or an analogous system of mistreatment. Id. 11202-203.
135. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, 365 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007).
136. Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1 -A, 231.
137. Id. 230 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. Id. 231.
139. See id. 1232.
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necessarily require identifying each individual by name.140 The tribunal
must also "specify the common criminal purpose in terms of both the crimi-
nal goal intended and its scope (for example, the temporal and geographic
limits of this goal, and the general identities of the intended victims)," as
well as detail the accused's contribution to the common plan.141 Whether a
crime comprises part of the JCE must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.142
Moreover, where the common criminal purpose is to commit crimes over a
large geographic area, a defendant may be liable for crimes within that area,
even if his contributions are only committed within a portion of that area.143
To date, however, those charged with crimes outside the geographic area in
which they were physically present have typically been high-ranking gov-
ernment officials. For example, although charging President Slobodan
Milogevid with the deaths of thousands across Bosnia and Croatia,'" the
prosecution has yet to attempt to hold someone like Tadid liable for all of
the deaths or persecutions committed throughout Bosnia based on his con-
tribution to an expansive, country-wide ethnic-cleansing JCE. 145 The
Appeals Chamber has also offered different statements on whether the con-
tribution to the criminal plan itself must be itself intrinsically criminal.14 6
The similarities between the language of JCE and the language of both
the IMT's organizational membership charges and conspiracy more
generally have led to much confusion. Recognizing the controversy attached
to these latter two forms of responsibility, the ICTY has taken pains to
explicitly distinguish JCE, emphasizing that JCE is "concerned with the
participation in the commission of a crime . . . , a different matter." 47 The
Appeals Chamber noted that liability premised on criminal organizational
membership such as during WWII would run counter to its mandate to
establish individual, not organizational or collective, culpability.'48 This
formal distinction has been criticized as a disingenuous attempt to use a
140. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, 430.
141. Id.
142. Prosecutor v. Popovid, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgement (Vol. 1), 1025 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010).
143. Id. 1024.
144. Prosecutor v. Milosevid, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Amended Indictment, V 1, 2 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 22, 2002); Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-
02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23,
2002).
145. Danner & Martinez, supra note 91, at 150.
146. See cases cited supra note 128.
147. Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub
Ojdanid's Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-Joint Criminal Enterprise, $ 26 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003).
148. Id. 25 ("The Secretary-General made it clear that only natural persons (as op-
posed to juridical entities) were liable under the Tribunal's Statute, and that mere membership
in a given criminal organization would not be sufficient to establish individual criminal re-
sponsibility.").
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controversial form of liability under a new name; the ICTY and its
proponents, however, maintain that the participation aspect of JCE does in
fact impose a higher burden, in theory, regarding the level of contribution
that would constitute an actus reus necessary to incur liability.14 9 Although
subsequent cases have rendered the actual-contribution requirement
something of a rhetorical quagmire,5 0 there appears to be some consensus
that the contribution must be "significant.""' What "significant" actually
entails is, of course, another matter.152 For example, in Prosecutor v. Krstid,
a commander of the notorious Drina Corps division of the Bosnian Serb
army was charged under JCE for the genocide committed at Srebrenica."I
The tribunal found, however, that although Krstid would have been aware of
the mass killings in and around Srebrenica and permitted his resources and
subordinates to take part in them, this was not sufficient to trigger liability
for the genocide. Instead, the Appeals Chamber found that the prosecution
had not proven that Krstid shared the genocidal intent of the JCE and thus
that his liability was akin to aiding and abetting, which permits a lesser
mens rea (knowledge) and results in accessorial liability.15 4 In contrast, in
Prosecutor v. Popovid, the commander's "ubiquitous" presence at the
locations of mass killings in and around Srebrenica and demonstrable
evidence that he coordinated and organized the logistics of the killings
rendered him guilty of genocide because he had significantly contributed to
149. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 91, at 118-19; Ohlin, supra note 91, at 696-98.
150. Compare Prosecutor v. Popovid, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgement (Vol. 1), H 1165,
1298, 1388, 1504, 1930 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010) ("[The ac-
cused] must have significantly contributed to the common purpose."), with Prosecutor v.
Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgement (Vol. 1), 103 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009) ("[A]n accused . .. need not act or fail to act in a way that assists,
encourages, or lends moral support to another in the perpetration of a crime or underlying of-
fence. Rather, the accused need merely act or fail to act 'in some way . . . directed to the
furtherance of the common plan or purpose.' "), and Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-
30/1-A, Judgement, 104 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005) ("Joint
criminal enterprise responsibility does not require any showing of superior responsibility, nor
the proof of a substantial or significant contribution."), and Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No.
IT-99-36-A, Judgement, $ 430 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007)
("[A]lthough the contribution need not be necessary or substantial, it should at least be a sig-
nificant contribution to the crimes for which the accused is to be found responsible.").
151. See Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges, $ 280 (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
docl286409.pdf (reviewing ICTY cases and concluding that "the current formulation of JCE
liability at the ad hoc tribunals only requires a significant contribution").
152. See, e.g., Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, 427 ("The Appeals Chamber considers
that not every type of conduct would amount to a significant enough contribution to the crime
for this to create criminal liability for the accused regarding the crime in question, and that the
pleading practice of the Prosecution, at least in cases where the Appeals Chamber has had an
opportunity to rule on the judgement, has followed this principle.").
153. Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgement in Appeals Chamber, [ 144,
151 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
154. Id.
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the JCE with genocidal intent.' In these cases, the requirements of intent
and level of contribution appear to merge, one often being indicative of the
other.
Although JCE as formulated may appear nearly identical to aiding and
abetting, the ICTY has adamantly distinguished the two. For example, aid-
ing and abetting is considered a secondary form of liability in which the
accused is treated as an accessory to the crime rather than a principal and is
thus considered less culpable.156 Under the ICTY's jurisprudence, aiding and
abetting, unlike JCE, does not require a common plan or shared intent be-
tween the accessory and principal, but only knowledge that the principal
will commit the crime.'57 Further, aiding and abetting is focused on specific
assistance that substantially effects the commission of a specific crime,
whereas JCE addresses broader criminal activity in which the principal par-
ticipates in a manner that furthers that plan.' While the aiding-and-abetting
formulation remains clear, the finer points of JCE, such as the breadth and
specificity of the common plan and the requisite contribution, remain re-
markably opaque. The ICC has recently confronted these distinctions in its
interpretation of the Rome Statute's own theories of liability.
B. The Rome Statute and the ICC's Control Theory of Liability
Despite receiving only cursory reference in the CMCR opinions, the
Rome Statute is notable because it codifies a list of crimes and correspond-
ing theories of liability. The Rome Statute is a product of negotiation and
agreement and has been signed by 137 states and ratified by 120 .1'9 Though
the language of its liability provisions is similar to that used by the ICTY,
there are important differences. Article 25(3) elaborates four types of liabil-
ity applicable to all crimes encompassed within the statute. In addition to
solicitation 60 and aiding and abetting, 16 1 the statute holds liable a person
who
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other
person is criminally responsible; [or]
155. Prosecutor v. Popovid, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgement (Vol. 1), [[ 1166-1168
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010).
156. See CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 716-17 (John Kaplan et a]. eds., 6th
ed. 2008).
157. Popovid, Case No. IT-05-88-T, 11014.
158. Id. 11029.
159. Status of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UNITED NATIONS
TREATIES COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgL
no=XVII-10&chapter-18&lang=en (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Status of the
Rome Statute]; see also Rome Statute, supra note 32.
160. Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 25(3)(b).
161. Id. art. 25(3)(c).
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(d) in any other way contributes to the commission or attempted
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall
either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or crim-
inal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to com-
mit the crime.162
Because both (a) and (d) include language reminiscent of JCE, the stat-
ute was initially thought to have codified JCE.163 Indeed, the CMCR found
as much in citing the Rome Statute as additional support that material sup-
port was triable by military commission by analogy to JCE.1" However,
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 1165 rejected an interpretation of 25(3)(a) that would
have aligned it with JCE, adopting instead a "control theory of liability."166
In the ICC's first judgment, Trial Chamber I upheld the Pre-Trial Chamber's
adoption of a control theory of liability for coperpetration through a com-
mon plan in 25(3)(a) and its concomitant rejection of JCE.167 Comparing
common-plan liability in 25(3)(a) to aiding-and-abetting liability in
25(3)(c), Trial Chamber I noted that "if accessories [to the crime] must have
had 'a substantial effect on the commission of the crime' to be held liable,
then coperpetrators must have had, pursuant to a systematic reading of this
provision, more than a substantial effect."168 It thus rejected a JCE-esque
reading of the provision because it felt that standard would not establish a
162. Id. art. 25(3)(a), (d).
163. Danner & Martinez, supra note 91, at 155; Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, The Pro-
liferation of the Law of International Criminal Tribunals Within Terrorism and "Unlawfid"
Combatancy Trials After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 599, 616-18 (2007);
Ohlin, supra note 91, at 706-07; Steven Powles, Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability
by Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 606, 617 (2004);
Wala, supra note 86, at 703.
164. United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1214 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc)
("Thus the ICC statute includes a JCE theory of individual criminal liability based upon the
knowing or purposeful contribution to the commission or attempted commission of such
crimes by a group acting with a common purpose."), rev'd, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25,
2013) (per curiam).
165. The ICC's judicial chambers are composed of Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appeals Cham-
bers. Rome Statute, supra note 32, arts. 34, 39.
166. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation
of Charges, i 322-338 (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf.
167. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, 1994 (Mar. 14,
2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl 379838.pdf.
168. Id. 1 997 (emphasis omitted).
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high-enough threshold of contribution to convict someone as a principal in
the commission of a crime.
In December 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I also rejected an analogy
between JCE and Article 25(3)(d) liability when it declined to confirm the
prosecution's charges against Callixte Mbarushimana.169 In doing so, the
Pre-Trial Chamber engaged in a critical analysis of both 25(3)(d)'s
requirements and its relationship to JCE.170 It found that liability under
Article 25(3)(d) is a form of residual secondary liability not already
included in the preceding liability provisions.17' Thus, unlike JCE, which the
ICTY read as a form of principal-commission liability,17 2 Article 25(3)(d)
has a lower mens rea standard: the accused must intend the acts that
contribute, but must only be aware of their contribution, to the crime.173 This
lower standard obviates the specific-intent requirements under JCE's shared
criminal intent element.174 Further, the Pre-Trial Chamber distinguished this
liability from aiding and abetting, which, unlike the ICTY, the ICC holds to
a purpose threshold.7 5
The ICC also distinguished its actus reus requirement from that of JCE.
Where the ICTY has been enigmatic in its treatment of contribution, the
ICC has been concrete. For liability to arise under 25(3)(d), the contribution
to the crime must "be at least significant." '7 The determination of what may
constitute a significant contribution requires "a case-by-case assessment ...
[to determine] whether a given contribution has a larger or smaller effect on
the crimes committed."' 7 Reviewing "leading scholars and past internation-
al cases" to determine "why defendants have been convicted as principals,
convicted as accessories or acquitted," the Pre-Trial Chamber distilled sev-
eral factors frequently used to assess culpability: "the sustained nature of the
169. Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, 1282 (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
docl286409.pdf. Mbarushimana was one of five civilian leaders of the Force Dimocratiques
de Libiration du Rwanda, a political and military organization formed in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo by members of the Rwandan armed forces and Interahamwe that fled
Rwanda after the Rwandan Patriotic Front ended the genocide. See id. IN 1-8. The Prosecu-
tion alleged that the Forces Dimocratiques committed war crimes and crimes against
humanity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to gamer public attention. Id. 111-13. The
Prosecution appealed the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision, but for prudential reasons, the Ap-
peals Chamber declined to examine the issue on the merits, finding both that the record was
insufficient and that a determination on the standard would not alter the ultimate decision on
the charges. Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/1 OA 4, Judgment,
1150-69 (May 30, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl420080.pdf.
170. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, 281.
171. Id. 1283.
172. See text accompanying supra note 157.
173. Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 25(3)(d).





participation"; efforts to prevent or impede the crimes; "whether the person
creates or merely executes the criminal plan"; the accused's position in the
organization; and "perhaps most importantly, the role the suspect played vis-
A-vis the seriousness and scope of the crimes committed."178 However, these
factors are not conclusive and should not replace an individualized assess-
ment that considers additional factors."' Key to the Pre-Trial Chamber's
discussion was the requirement of a clear causal relationship between the
contribution and the commission of a crime. The ICC has thus initially indi-
cated that Article 25 creates a sliding scale of greater to lesser forms of
liability, and the most attenuated form of liability recognized by the court
still requires a significant contribution to an underlying offense.
III. JCE AND MATERIAL SUPPORT: A MISTAKEN ANALOGY
Due to the absence of other definitive resources and the way in which
the international criminal tribunals have largely subsumed the field of crimi-
nal liability for war crimes, U.S. courts have been forced to rely on the
opinions and statutes of the international tribunals. However, since neither
the opinions of the ICTY and ICC nor their respective statutes explicitly
recognize "material support" as an offense, the military commissions in par-
ticular have sought recourse in analogy of the crime to JCE. Yet despite
paying rhetorical homage to the doctrine, the CMCR failed to properly ap-
ply it, and the D.C. Circuit simply ignored it. While the CMCR was content
to find a "similar analytical nexus" between the JCE and material support,18 0
an assessment of their elements demonstrates how inapt that analogy is.
A. The MCA and Material Support for Terrorism
Both Hamdan and Al Bahlul were charged with providing material sup-
port for terrorism.' The MCA defines material support for terrorism as
follows:
Any person subject to this chapter who provides material support or
resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in prepara-
tion for, or in carrying out, an act of terrorism (as set forth in
paragraph (24) of this section), or who intentionally provides mate-
rial support or resources to an international terrorist organization
engaged in hostilities against the United States, knowing that such
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1286 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc), rev'd, 696 F.3d
1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
181. United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1155 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc),
rev'd, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam); Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d at
1254; see also 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (2011).
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organization has engaged or engages in terrorism, shall be punished
182
The conduct constituting material support is further defined with refer-
ence to the parallel domestic criminal law provision of the same offense, 83
which defines material support or resources as
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false doc-
umentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more indi-
viduals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except
medicine or religious materials ... 184
Finally, the Manual for Military Commissions, issued by the Depart-
ment of Defense, elaborates the specific elements of each listed offense,
articulating two distinct ways to violate the material-support provision.18 1
First, an accused may provide material support for a terrorist act, in which
case the prosecution must prove (1) that the accused provided material sup-
port "to be used in preparation for, or carrying out, an act of terrorism"; (2)
that the accused knew or intended the support to be used for those purposes;
and (3) that "the conduct took place in the context of and was associated
with hostilities."' 86 Incorporating the definition of terrorism in paragraph 24
should, as a procedural matter, require that the prosecution further prove that
the attack for which the material support was provided was committed "in a
manner calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government or civil-
ian population by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against
government conduct." 87 This raises the question of whether the individuals
accused of providing material support must themselves intend this to be the
purpose of the attack, or whether they must only have knowledge that such
is the purpose of the principal perpetrator.
The second way an accused may provide material support is "to a ter-
rorist organization engaged in hostilities against the United States."'88 This
requires the prosecution to prove that the accused (1) provided such support,
(2) intended to provide that support "to an international terrorist organiza-
tion," (3) knew the organization "has engaged or engages in terrorism," and
that (4) the "conduct took place in the context of and was associated with
182. 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25)(A).
183. See id. § 950t(25)(B).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2011) (emphasis added).
185. DEP'T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM'Ns, pt. 4, § 6(25) (2010) [hereinaf-
ter MMC].
186. Id. pt. 4, § 6(25)(b)(A).
187. Id. pt. 4, § 6(24)(a).
188. Id. pt. 4, § 6(25)(b)(B)(1).
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hostilities."'" In this formulation, the only required actus reus appears to be
as simple as providing oneself in any capacity to a designated terrorist or-
ganization. Because military commissions have personal jurisdiction only
over alien unlawful enemy combatants,190 the so-called fourth element
seems to be resolved by determining personal jurisdiction, a threshold mat-
ter. At least, it is difficult to see how a court could determine that an accused
was an enemy combatant without being aware that his conduct took place in
the context of hostilities. It is thus unclear how this element can also serve
as a criminal element subject to the reasonable-doubt standard, since its de-
termination pretrial effectively removes it as a legitimate constraint on the
determination of guilt or innocence of the accused.
Hamdan was charged and convicted under both iterations of material
support, while Al Bahlul was charged and convicted only under the second
form of providing material support to a terrorist organization.' 9 ' Under this
latter formulation, there is no requirement that the accused have contributed
to or facilitated any actual terrorist attack or war crime, nor that he even had
knowledge of any specific plan to commit a future violation. Rather, if
providing oneself amounts to material support, it seems possible that an ac-
cused could be convicted for travelling to an Al Qaeda encampment and
joining the organization, even if he was detained the very next day, so long
as he intended to provide his personal support to Al Qaeda with knowledge
of its prior attacks. No further completed attack need even occur. Although
the statutory language of the first provision criminalizing material support
for a terrorist act could be read to require knowledge of and support directly
intended to contribute to a specific act of terrorism, this has not been its ap-
plication. Rather, Hamdan was charged under both iterations for the same
conduct, and no knowledge of nor direct contribution to any attack was re-
quired to convict him; instead it was sufficient to allege that by providing
personal driving services to Osama bin Laden, Hamdan knew that "he was
directly facilitating communication and planning used for an act of terror-
ism."' 92 This application of the charge largely erases any genuine distinction
between the two forms of material support.
Thus, material support is similar to an inchoate conspiracy charge, as
both predicate criminal liability on the manifestation of a common or shared
criminal intent rather than on any harm deriving from a terrorist act that an
accused helped to bring about. Although conspiracy requires an agreement
whereas material support requires some sort of provision of support, where
that support is merely joining a terrorist organization, the distinction
becomes elusive.
189. Id. pt. 4, § 6(25)(b)(B)(1)-(4).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 948c (2011).
191. United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1192-93, 1264 (C.M.C.R. 2011)
(en banc), rev'd, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam); Hamdan II, 801 F Supp.
2d 1247, 1258 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc), rev'd, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
192. Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1258.
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The most important difference between material support and conspiracy
lies in the two charges' respective mens rea requirements: conspiracy typi-
cally requires a shared criminal purpose,193 while material support requires
only that one know of the terrorist activities of the organization.194 Indeed, it
seems possible to convict someone of material support even if they pos-
sessed the diametrically opposed intent to prevent further terrorist attacks.
This was precisely the proposition posed to the U.S. Supreme Court in
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, where the Court confirmed that assis-
tance-even where designed to mainstream terrorist organizations away
from violence and into politics-would violate the law.195 In any instance,
the CMCR has not belabored the distinction's niceties.'96
The conduct alleged to prove the charges in Al Bahlul and Hamdan II is
instructive of how the prosecution intends to use its new statutory weapon.
Al Bahlul was alleged primarily to have provided himself as support to Al
Qaeda by pledging bayat, or fealty, and by serving in the public relations of-
fice of Al Qaeda.197 Although contested by his attorney on appeal, he was
found to have created a promotional video aimed at gaining recruits to Al
Qaeda following the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole.198 No allegations that Al
Bahlul had "any foreknowledge" of any terrorist act, or that he was present
or privy to any such act, were made.'" As his attorney argued in brief,
"From the opening statement, through the testimony of every witness to the
summation, Mr. Bahlul's trial was about his film."2m Hamdan has likewise
never been alleged to have been present at, or to have possessed fore-
knowledge of, any terrorist act.201 Rather, like Al Bahlul, Hamdan was
charged and convicted of conduct comprising providing himself as material
support to Al Qaeda by joining the organization, pledging bayat, and serving
as a driver and bodyguard to Osama bin Laden.
193. See CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 156, at 820-21.
194. 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25)(A) (2011).
195. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717-18, 2725 (2010).
196. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1221-23 ("Resolution of this enduring and complex
controversy is not essential to decide appellant's challenge... . The similarity between appel-
lant's conviction of conspiracy in the Specification of Charge I and providing material support
for terrorism in the Specification of Charge Il, including the same ten overt acts, informs our
analysis of the assigned error.").
197. Charge Sheet at 1, Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, MC Form 458.
198. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1161; Charge Sheet, supra note 197, at 1.
199. Brief of Petitioner in Al Bahlul, supra note 19, at 4.
200. Id. at 8. On appeal to the CMCR as well as to the D.C. Circuit, Al Bahlul has also
raised an equal protection challenge and a First Amendment challenge to premising any form
of criminal liability on the video itself as expressive, political conduct. Id. at 13.
201. See Charge Sheet, Hamdan II, 801 F Supp. 2d 1247, MC Form 458.
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B. The CMCR's Problematic Analysis
As discussed above, JCE comprised one of the only relevant interna-
tional analogues cited by the CMCR. However, despite its relevance, any
analogy between material support and JCE is a mistaken one. An attempt to
link material support to JCE is to analogize the terrorist organization to the
criminal enterprise and the provision of support to the contribution. Yet, as
elaborated below, such parallels are prohibitively problematic as a result of
decisive differences in the mens rea and causation requirements.
First, the mens rea requirements are distinct. For basic JCE, the prose-
cution must identify the criminal object of the common plan and must prove
that the accused and all members of the JCE shared the criminal intent to
commit that crime.202 Knowledge of the crime is insufficient to trigger liabil-
ity. Material support for a terrorist act, in contrast, does not require a shared
intent, but instead requires only that the accused intended to provide support
with knowledge that the support would be used to commit the underlying
crime (terrorist acts).2 03 In the case of providing material support to a terror-
ist organization, there is no requirement of knowledge of a particular
terrorist act to which the accused would be prospectively contributing; it is
sufficient that he has knowledge that such a crime has been committed by
the organization at some point in the past.204 This is on its face antithetical to
the requirements of JCE. Extended JCE applies to crimes other than the one
intended by the JCE and thus would not appear to apply in the cases of most
detainees, since trials center around the underlying crime and criminal goal
of terrorism. 205
This low mens rea standard may in part be explained by the conceptual-
ization of membership in a terrorist organization as a stand-in for shared
criminal intent. Yet such a conceptualization would be incredibly problemat-
ic, since membership does not establish a shared intent toward a particular
crime and, moreover, is an element of the crime subject to government des-
ignation rather than the evidentiary burdens of a criminal trial. 206 The charge
thus takes as a predicate one of the key elements of the offense. The label
"terrorist organization" effectively alleviates the need to demonstrate a
shared criminal intent (the intent itself being embodied in the "terrorist"
designation) or to link the accused's mental state to a specific crime. In con-
trast to this administrative designation, at the ICTY, a JCE must be defined
by its temporal and geographic scope, the plurality of participants, and its
202. Tadi6 Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 1 228 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
203. MMC, supra note 185, pt. 4, § 6(25)(B).
204. Id.
205. Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 228.
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6) (2011); Brief of Petitioner in Al Bahlul, supra note 19,
at 10; Brief of Petitioner in Hamdan II, supra note 19, at 40-43.
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common criminal objective. 207 Because material support obviates the need
to do so, it is unclear how the courts can determine whether a particular
crime fell within or outside the JCE and thus whether basic or extended JCE
and their concomitant mens rea requirements should apply.
The mens rea distinction highlights a primary problem with material
support's actus reus requirements: a JCE is not an entity or an organization.
The use of terms such as "join" and "member" in the ICTY's language de-
scribing JCE causes much confusion. But, as noted above, an enterprise is
not an organization that can be joined in the common connotation of these
words. To the extent that "membership" means anything in a JCE context, it
is that the accused joined in and shared intent to commit the alleged crime-
the only way to "join" a JCE.20 8 This concept of "joining" in ICL thus goes
to establishing the mens rea necessary for committing the crime and thus
does not comprise the actus reus of the crime. By borrowing the term, if not
the meaning, the language of the material-support provision permits the fu-
sion of mens rea and actus reus into the concept of providing oneself as
support by "joining" a terrorist organization. This is why, in the case of
Hamdan and Al Bahlul, joining the organization and pledging bayat both
demonstrate the necessary mens rea and comprise the only acts that, accord-
ing the statute, need to be charged. Although Al Bahlul was charged with
additional conduct that could conceivably comprise material support, this
was not necessary by the terms of the statute.20
Similarly, making the underlying criminal offense-terrorism or a ter-
rorist act-a matter of administrative designation obviates the JCE
requirement of finding a significant contribution to a specified crime. The
tenuousness of the "conduct" requirement in the material-support charge is
demonstrated by a comparison of Hamdan and Al Bahlul's charges. Where-
as Al Bahlul was effectively charged with soliciting membership in Al
Qaeda 210 conduct that the U.S. government could plausibly argue contribut-
ed to a given attack, it is exceedingly more difficult to ascertain how
Hamdan's conduct of serving as a driver and bodyguard did so. Both the
specificity of allegation and the causal nexus between conduct and underly-
ing crime are lacking against both defendants. Although the first definition
of material support for a terrorist attack may in fact be analogous to JCE if
charged properly, that is, linking the accused's participation directly to a
207. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, 430 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007).
208. Fletcher, supra note 53, at 445 ("But we need to realize the peculiarly American
way of thinking about conspiracy. The charge against Hamdan is not that Hamdan, bin Laden,
and others entered into an agreement to commit terrorist acts, but rather that Hamdan, as bin
Laden's driver, 'joined an existing conspiracy.' It is not clear how one joins a conspiracy but if
you think of a criminal conspiracy as something like a criminal organization, then presumably
you can join by collaborating with the organization with the intent to further its goals.").
209. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (defining material support to include the provision of
"personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself)" (emphasis added)).
210. Charge Sheet, supra note 197, at 1.
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specific terrorist attack, the statutory elements for the second definition-
providing material support to a terrorist organization-intrinsically fail this
test. Material support obscures the causal connection or nature of a contribu-
tion to the actual underlying offense, obviating the need for the government
to link the conduct of the accused to the actual harm-causing crime itself.
There is simply no analogue in modem ICL for that kind of inchoate li-
ability. The closest parallel-reference to the IMT's attempt to declare
certain organizations criminal-cannot support the weight of the point. Be-
sides being rejected by every subsequent tribunal, the criminality of those
organizations were subjects of their own criminal trials; of the seven organi-
zations charged, only three were found to be criminal. 2" Thus, even with
regard to the ICL precedent most conducive to the government's argument,
the courts ultimately determined the criminality of the organizations. While
this may seem of little consequence when referring to Al Qaeda, at least in
its current form, such a principle becomes substantially harder to sustain
when applied to other allegedly terrorist organizations that are more diverse,
whose "terrorism" designation is more controversial, and that comprise var-
ious factions that are linked but not identical. In this regard, groups such as
the Irish Republican Army and Sinn Fein or Hezbollah come to mind.
The truly fatal error in the analogy is that material support is functional-
ly an inchoate offense in direct contradiction to ICL precedent. The lip
service paid by the CMCR to the distinction between vicarious liability and
inchoate offenses belies the panel's imposition of the latter, ignoring that to
use the former, both defendants would need to be charged with an actual
war crime.212 JCE is not an offense. Tadid was not found guilty of JCE; he
was found guilty of killing the men in Jaskici, that is, guilty of murder.213
Indeed, the Appeals Chamber underscored the point when it rejected a Trial
Chamber assertion that one could aid and abet a JCE; because JCE is not an
offense in itself, a defendant cannot aid and abet it.2 14
But is this just semantics? Even if the courts were to acknowledge that,
as provided in the statute, material support impermissibly constitutes an in-
choate offense, what would prevent the government from recharging
Hamdan or Al Bahlul for an underlying terrorist attack? For example, as a
211. Danner & Martinez, supra note 91, at 113-14.
212. United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1203 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc)
("Review of the elements of [MST] amply demonstrates that appellant's charged conduct is
not an inchoate offense.... [It] is akin to providing direct support to an ongoing criminal en-
terprise .... [and] is essentially co-perpetrator liability."), rev'd, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan.
25, 2013) (per curiam); Hamdan II, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1285-86 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en
banc) ("JCE doctrine provides a theory of liability for proving a specific crime, and it is not a
stand-alone substantive offense."), rev'd, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
213. Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 1 327 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); Prosecutor v. Tadid, IT-94- 1-I, Amended Indictment, Counts
29-34 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1995).
214. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1 -A, Judgement, 191 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005).
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matter of ICL, what would prevent the government from retrying Hamdan
and Al Bahlul for an actual terrorist attack under a theory of JCE or aiding
and abetting based on their alleged contribution to its commission? When
the CMCR referred in its analysis to "culpability," was it merely attempting
to acknowledge that ICL has recognized the type of conduct and type of lia-
bility sufficient for culpability to attach to these defendants, even if
Congress codified this type of criminal liability under a different name and
treated it like a substantive offense? For example, whether or not Al Bahlul's
contribution could be sufficient to convict him under ICL, is it not plausible
to allege that he intentionally joined Al Qaeda and solicited additional
members, which in fact contributed to the commission of at least one terror-
ist attack? And if it can be so alleged under JCE, what is the reason that the
CMCR could also not so find, even if its legal analysis is less than exempla-
ry in explaining why? Is there really a there there to this Note's critique?
If the argument were to rely entirely on the rhetoric of the ICTY, the an-
swer very well may be no. Despite the schizophrenic renderings of the
tribunal's chambers that periodically recast JCE requirements,215 there is lit-
tle as a textual matter that, if applied to Hamdan or Al Bahlul, would not
place them in exactly the same situation as they are now. Yet when one
transcends the expansive dicta of the tribunal, as the ICC recently did,2 16 the
facts of the cases they have considered speak for themselves, and they speak
loudly.
To date, U.S. courts that have examined the ICTY's jurisprudence have
been blind to this context. Untethered from its unique ICL foundations, the
tribunal's law floats freely-a contribution, significant or substantial, crimi-
nal or not, to a common plan or purpose: it could mean anything. And in the
military commissions, it has. The CMCR has readily taken note, as have the
scholars who have cautioned against this reckless experiment in utilizing in-
dividuals' criminal liability to build an area of legal scholarship and
doctrine. 2 17 Yet the context of that jurisprudence and the facts presented to
the Tribunal speak volumes. Not a single ICTY case cited by the CMCR has
found liability for analogous conduct or convicted a defendant on facts
remotely resembling that of either Al Bahlul or Hamdan. A review of the
defendant who provided the primary vehicle for the development of JCE
proves illuminating: Tadi6 was tied to the murders of five men by having
been part a single group of men who, in the same place, at the same time,
beat numerous Bosniak men, some of whom died. Like the accused in the
WWII cases that the ICTY looked to in developing JCE, Tadid, Popovid,
Krsti6, and Ojdanid were all physically present and in a position of authori-
215. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
216. See Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges, U 280-284 (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
docl286409.pdf.
217. See Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility Under the
Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 109, 133 (2007); Danner &
Martinez, supra note 91, at 150.
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ty, actively participating, or both, in the pervasive, mass crimes for which
they were convicted.218 There is nothing plausibly analogous between their
conduct and that of Hamdan or Al Bahlul. Yet despite the obvious dissimi-
larities in actual conduct, the expansive rhetoric of the ICTY does little to
define the doctrine's limits, allowing courts to wield this prosecutorial
weapon indiscriminately.
IV. ICTY JURISPRUDENCE & PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
No matter the failure of the analogy, a broader problem left unaddressed
by the CMCR is the authority of the ICTY and the status of JCE as a matter
of international law. As detailed above, the court's objective in supporting its
jurisdiction is to identify customary international law. Yet international law's
statist doctrine of sources prevents courts and scholars from creating or con-
tributing to the development of customary norms, which remain as a formal
matter a result only of the crystallization of state practice. Herein lies the
paradox of ICL, a body of law that has been defined by judicial innovations
of vague and dated treaty language. The fact that the ICTY articulated a the-
ory of JCE liability does not render it unquestionably a rule of customary
international law, even if the tribunal has ostensibly dominated the ICL field.
The CMCR stated that JCE "has been adopted or recognized ... under
customary international law" since the 1990s, when the ICTY first articulat-
ed it in Tadid.2 19 In part, the CMCR relied on the fact that the ICTY's
jurisdiction was confined to "those areas of international humanitarian law
which were beyond any doubt part of customary international law."220 While
in theory the ICTY's authority is so constrained, in practice the tribunal has
engaged in a wide-ranging project to create ICL, taking liberties in trans-
gressing its statutory limitations. In doing so, the ICTY's jurisprudence and
its adoption by subsequent tribunals exposes the modern fragility of formal
public international law doctrine and demonstrates the need for new analyti-
cal frameworks to interpret, apply, and constrain this unwieldy body of law.
A. Sources of Public International Law
The law of nations, or international law, comprises both positive and
customary law. As articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, in the absence of
either a binding treaty or domestic legislation, "resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the
works of jurists and commentators."221 Customary international law "results
from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
218. Danner & Martinez, supra note 91, at 111 (reviewing the World War II cases cited
for the proposition).
219. United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1210 (C.M.C.R. 2011) (en banc),
rev'd, No. 11-1324 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) (per curiam).
220. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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sense of legal obligation." 22 That sense of legal obligation (opinio juris) is
essential, such that common practice alone from which a state would feel
free to deviate does not evidence a rule of customary international law. 223 In
determining the customary status of a rule, most courts look to the statutory
scheme of the International Court of Justice (IC). Article 38 recognizes as
sources of international law treaties, customary law, "general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations," and "judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."224 This last source is
qualified by the fact that the each of the ICJ's own decisions "has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." 225
Although formally binding only on the ICJ, this description of the proper
sources of international law has been adopted as "canonical" or
"constitutional" for the determination and interpretation of international
law.226
Often referred to as the doctrine of sources, the ICJ Statute enshrines a
central premise of formal international law: international courts cannot
"make law" through binding precedent,227 their judicial opinions being
granted only a subsidiary status as evidencing, but not establishing, interna-
tional law. This is reflected in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law, which omits judicial decisions from a list of sources of international
law but, concurrent with the ICJ Statute, lists them as persuasive secondary
evidence of existing international law. 2 28 This framework poses a challenge
to domestic courts seeking to apply ICL. Though judgments of the ICTY are
one of the only sources interpreting and applying individual criminal liabil-
ity for violations of the laws of war, under the formal limitations of
international law, they offer only persuasive interpretations of customary in-
ternational law, on par with that of any other scholar or jurist.2 29 Judicial
institutions' persuasive rather than precedential authority is ostensibly sub-
ject to the strength and legitimacy of their legal analysis; the absence of
222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 102(2) (1987).
223. Id. § 102 cmt. c.
224. ICJ Statute, supra note 39, art. 38 (emphasis added).
225. Id. art. 59.
226. GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND
PERSPECTIVES 46, 52 (2012); Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial
Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 631, 637 (2005).
227. Danner, supra note 42, at 34-35.
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 reporters' n.l (1987);
see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("[R]esort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commen-
tators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribu-
nals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is." (emphasis added)).
229. Danner, supra note 42, at 49.
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hierarchy suggests that under a formalist approach, any conflicts between
such judicial institutions should be resolved on the soundness of their argu-
ments as reflections of customary international law as it is.230 Consequently,
international tribunals cannot create or advance new norms alone. Yet that is
precisely what they have unabashedly sought to do, embracing an interna-
tional "common law," often of necessity.2 3 1
In its opinions, the CMCR failed to situate its sources within this inter-
national law framework. However, three U.S. circuit courts of appeal
confronted with ICL jurisprudence have engaged in such an analysis; the
disparate results at which they have arrived demonstrate the travails plagu-
ing the interpretation and application of ICL doctrine.
B. Tribunal Precedent: An Intercircuit Debate
In the last decade, U.S. federal courts have been faced with a series of
lawsuits originating under the domestic Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).2 32 A
number of these recent suits, as relevant here, have asked courts to hold var-
ious corporations liable for extrajudicial killings, torture, war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity. Much of this litigation has focused
on how the courts can and should determine what theories of liability and
what level of mens rea are sufficient to hold corporations liable for such
crimes as a result of their collaboration or association with government enti-
ties committing the underlying offenses. 2 33 That is, like Al Bahlul and
Hamdan, the corporations are not alleged to have physically perpetrated the
crimes in question, but rather to be liable under a theory of vicarious liabil-
ity for their support or contribution to crimes physically perpetrated by
others. In addressing these claims, the U.S. federal courts have engaged in a
far more complex and nuanced analysis of the role that ICTY jurisprudence
and the Rome Statute play in international law and thus their respective au-
thority to define customary rules regarding international standards of
230. See BOAS, supra note 226, at 91; WARD N. FERDIDANDUSSE, DIRECT APPLICATION
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS 6, 129 (2006); Joseph Powderly,
Judicial Interpretation at the Ad Hoc Tribunals: Method from Chaos?, in JUDICIAL CREATIVI-
TY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 40, at 17, 39; Mohamed
Shahabuddeen, Judicial Creativity and Joint Criminal Enterprise, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 40, at 184, 203.
231. Antonio Cassese, The ICTY A Living and Vital Reality, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. J. 585,
589-90 (2004); Robert Cryer, The Doctrinal Foundations of International Criminalization, in
1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: SOURCES, SUBJECTS, AND CONTENTS, supra note 87, at
119; Powderly, supra note 230, at 30-31.
232. The Alien Tort Statute established a civil cause of action by an alien "for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2011).
233. See Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 E3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582
E3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 267 (2d Cir.
2007).
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liability. The result is an intercircuit conflict that frames the obstacles pre-
sented in interpreting and applying ICL in new contexts.
1. The Second Circuit
In Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals issued a per curiam opinion vacating a district court dismissal
and holding that plaintiffs could sue under the ATCA on an aiding-and-
abetting theory of liability.234 Judges Katzmann and Korman issued
accompanying opinions 235 in which they agreed that the relevant mens rea
was purpose; however, they differed as to their reasoning, thus engaging
each other in a detailed analysis of the authority of ICTY jurisprudence and
the Rome Statute as a matter of public international law doctrine. Judge
Katzmann began by situating his analysis with reference to the ICJ Statute
and conducting a comprehensive review of the relevant conventions, stat-
utes, and jurisprudence 236 to conclude that aiding-and-abetting liability was
recognized as a matter of customary international law.2 37 However, he rec-
ognized that liability only where it was defined so as to require a substantial
contribution that was made with purpose. Judge Katzmann distinguished the
decisions of the ICTY (applying a lesser knowledge standard) from the
Rome Statute's requirement of purpose, noting that "the decisions of the
ICTY and ICTR ... arise out of completely distinct factual contexts and of-
ten involve defendants who might have been convicted on alternate theories
of liability" and that ICTY opinions "occasionally (and consciously) en-
gaged in discussions peripheral to the ratio decidendi of a case . . . ."238
Consequently, while recognizing ICTY opinions as constituting some evi-
dence of customary law, Judge Katzmann rejected the idea that the ad hoc
tribunals' determinations could be sufficient to establish a knowledge stand-
ard under customary international law for purposes of the ATCA suits. 23 9
Judge Korman agreed insofar as the ultimate standard for aiding-and-
abetting liability to be recognized by the courts but differed both as to the
standard's application to the case and to the reasoning Judge Katzmann used
to arrive at that standard. 24 0 Even recognizing that the Rome Statute may ev-
234. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260.
235. Judge Hall also issued a concurring opinion. However, while he concurred in the
result, he disagreed with both Judges Katzmann and Korman in looking to international law
for the answer and would have determined the appropriateness of accessorial liability by look-
ing to domestic law. Id. at 284 (Hall, J., concurring). As such, his opinion is not discussed
here.
236. See id. at 267-84 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (reviewing and comparing liability
under the London Charter, Control Council 10, the Rome Statute, the statutes of the ad hoc
tribunals, a number of multilateral conventions, and the judicial decisions of the ICTY and
ICTR).
237. Id. at 277.
238. Id. at 278 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. Id. at 279.
240. Id. at 292-93 (Korman, J., concurring).
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idence a current customary rule of international law for aiding-and-abetting
liability now, Judge Korman was skeptical that at the time of the conduct al-
leged in the case there was "any well established and universally recognized
definition of aiding-and-abetting sufficient to be considered customary in-
ternational law for the purposes of the ATCA."241' Unlike Judge Katzmann,
Judge Korman believed that courts must undertake "a norm-by-norm analy-
sis to determine whether international law extends the scope of liability for a
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued," at least where it in-
volves a private (nonstate) actor.242 In the case before the court, the plaintiffs
were seeking liability for extrajudicial killings carried out under the apart-
heid regime in South Africa; consequently, Judge Korman did not think that
ICL jurisprudence could necessarily create a customary rule of liability for
crimes unrelated to those within the tribunals' mandate or subject matter.243
More importantly, he rejected Judge Katzmann's "gratuitous sugges-
tion" that the ICTY and ICTR cases cited could prospectively "provide a
reliable basis for a broader definition [encompassing a knowledge standard]
than the one proscribed in the Rome Statute."2" First, Judge Korman noted
the context-specific nature of the ICTY statute, whose terms linking crimes
against humanity to armed conflict belie the subsequent development of in-
ternational criminal law, which no longer does. 245 He also criticized Judge
Katzmann's reference to several ICTY cases that adopted a knowledge
standard.24 6 In reviewing the Tadi6, Kvocka, and Furundzija judgments,
Judge Korman underscored that much of the analysis was "rambling" dicta,
unnecessary and irrelevant to the actual facts of those cases in which the ac-
tus reus and mens rea requirements more aptly matched JCE than aiding and
abetting.
[T]o the extent that any language in these opinions suggest more
than that, it rises only to the level of dicta, of which peremptory
norms of international law are not made. Indeed, the leading
treatise Judge Katzmann cites explains that "decisions of
international tribunals ... exercise considerable influence as an
impartial and considered statement of the law by jurists of authority
in light of actual problems which arise before them." Dicta
unrelated to the actual problems which arise before them do not
warrant such deference. 247
Both judges made a number of insightful moves. They articulated both
the standard for customary international law and the nature of the varied
241. Id. at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. Id. at 331 (internal quotation marks omitted).
243. See id. at 292-93.
244. Id. at 333.
245. Id. at 334.
246. See id. at 337.
247. Id. at 337 (citation omitted).
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sources that may be relied on to determine a customary rule. They properly
distinguished the authoritative quality of the Rome Statute and tribunal
judgments, noting the persuasive nature of both and looking to them as evi-
dence of customary law without treating either as determinative. In
reconciling the discordant views on aiding-and-abetting liability in the two
sources, both judges carefully weighed the persuasive authority of each with
reference to state practice. Judge Korman, however, went one step further:
rather than simply assess the ICTY's persuasive authority generally within
the hierarchy of sources, he viewed it as necessary to assess the persuasive
weight of the opinions themselves, distilling the facts and distinguishing
dicta from necessary legal holdings, and refusing to accord persuasive
weight to the former.248 He further expressed reticence to apply a theory of
liability outside the norms and circumstances in which it originated. 249 Alt-
hough not resolving this dispute between Judges Katzmann and Korman, the
Second Circuit in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. re-
affirmed the purpose standard for aiding and abetting. 250 The court
admonished that "[r]ecognition of secondary liability is no less significant a
decision than whether to recognize a whole new tort in the first place."251
2. The D.C. Circuit
In 2011, the Fourth Circuit and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals were
both presented with similar cases. In reviewing the Second Circuit's interna-
tional law analysis, the two courts split on their interpretation of
international law standards. The D.C. Circuit rejected the analysis of both
Judge Katzmann and Judge Korman, finding that the decisions of the IMT,
the National Military Tribunals, and the ad hoc tribunals were "authoritative
sources" that trumped the Rome Statute.252 The court not only rejected the
Rome Statute as treaty law not applicable to customary international law,253
but seemed to argue that even if the Rome Statute applied, Article 25(3)(d)
liability and its knowledge standard, not subsection (c)-which specifically
refers to "aiding and abetting" and requires purpose-would apply.25 4
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247-48 (2d
Cir. 2009). In reference to Khulumani's fractured opinion, the court noted that both Judge
Katzmann and Judge Korman ultimately agreed that aiding-and-abetting liability required
purpose after both adopting the language of the Rome Statute, rather than the ICTY's
knowledge precedent. Id. at 258.
251. Id. at 259. Unlike Khulumani, Talisman Energy confronted the court with the fur-
ther question of conspiracy liability and noted that while JCE was the ICL analogue, the court
could not review the issue because it was not sufficiently pled. Id. at 252.
252. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
253. Id. at 35.
254. Id. at 37.
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Although the D.C. Circuit is correct in that a treaty, standing alone, does
not rise to the standard of customary law, the court's language evinced a
perception of treaty law and customary law as two distinct and nonoverlap-
ping fields. This misconstrues both international law and the Second
Circuit's analysis which, in looking for evidence of customary norms, de-
termined that the treaty rather than the ICTY judgments more strongly
represented an international consensus on the appropriate form of liability,
since it represented a clear expression of a majority of states.2 55 The court's
confusion may derive from its apparent failure to distinguish between
"sources of international law" as those that create or develop international
law and sources that can serve as persuasive evidence of what the law is. 256
Unlike judicial decisions, multilateral agreements exemplify state practice,
and thus can contribute to, while not being determinative of, the formation
of customary law.257 This is consistent with the Second Circuit's conclusion
that the Rome Statute better evidenced international agreement than the
ICTY's juridical pronouncements.
3. The Fourth Circuit
Parting ways with the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit in Aziz v. Alcolac
noted the divergent rationales of its sister courts and adopted that of the
Second Circuit.258
While we agree with the premise that the Rome Statute does not
constitute customary international law, we find that its status as a
treaty cuts in favor of accepting its mens rea standard as authorita-
tive for purposes of ATS aiding and abetting liability... . In our
view, then, the Rome Statute constitutes a source of the law of na-
tions, and, at that, a source whose mens rea articulation of aiding
and abetting liability is more authoritative than that of the ICTY
and ICTR tribunals.
Granting the Rome Statute preference over customary interna-
tional law to resolve the issue before us is particularly appropriate
given the latter's elusive characteristics. 259
Consequently it, like the Second Circuit, found that the fact that the
ICTY had applied the knowledge standard did not indicate a consensus for
applying such liability and thus that knowledge, rather than purpose, did not
have the "requisite acceptance among civilized nations" for application in
255. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'1 Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 333-36 (2d Cir. 2007).
256. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 102 reporters' n.5 (1987).
257. See id. § 102 reporters' n.4.
258. Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 F.3d 388, 396-98 (4th Cir. 2011).
259. Id. at 399-400 (footnote omitted).
Michigan Journal of International Law
federal courts. 26 0 Despite arriving at the same result, the court also
misconstrued the international law analysis. While treaties can trump prior
customary norms, they may do so only for the parties involved.2 6 1 Because
the United States is not a party, the Rome Statute is not necessarily more
authoritative for the mere fact of being a treaty; rather, the Second Circuit
allocated it more persuasive weight precisely because it evidenced a
consensus among 120 states as to the state of the law. 262
The prominence and loquacity of the ICTY on the topic should not ob-
scure the fact that JCE remains a formulation by an ad hoc tribunal whose
intricate criminal theories are neither immediately relevant nor of interest to
most states. This is all the more important given the ICC's early rulings,
which have appeared to reject JCE as it has been formulated by the ad hoc
tribunals. 263 While the U.S. cases discussed here predate several of these rul-
ings, going forward the courts will not be able to gloss over the clear
conflict in liability thresholds between the two international courts. Alt-
hough the ICC's decisions reflect an interpretation of the Rome Statute,
rather than direct reliance on customary law, if the Rome Statute is in fact
more indicative of state consensus, should its decisions not also be granted
greater persuasive weight in evidencing customary international law than
those of the ad hoc ICTY? In a legal system that does not recognize judicial
lawmaking, on what basis should courts resolve such intercourt conflicts? In
confronting conflicting interpretations among ICL institutions, courts will
need to assess how to weigh disparate analyses and to consider the sustaina-
bility of the fiction that an expanding body of law is little more than
persuasive scholarly opinion. This intercourt discussion frames the chal-
lenge that the public international law doctrine presents to the development
of ICL.
C. The ICTY's Persuasive Authority
To date, the U.S. courts that have attempted to assess ICTY jurispru-
dence with respect to public international law's strictures have focused on
the tribunal's statutory provisions and accorded the ICTY's judgments def-
erential acceptance. Despite Judge Korman's caution, they have largely
failed to analyze this jurisprudence with respect to the actual problems that
gave rise to their decisions or to examine the soundness of the legal ration-
ales and contextual motivations offered to justify them. In determining
whether JCE can or should evidence a customary international law corollary
to the charges against Hamdan and Al Bahlul, the courts must assess the
persuasive authority of the ICTY vis-A-vis other international scholarly
opinion and in light of the unique context and informal constraints that have
260. Id. at 401.
261. RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 cmt. j (1987).
262. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 333 (2d Cir. 2007).
263. See supra Part II.B.
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shaped ICTY jurisprudence and ICL more broadly. Several factors are inte-
gral to this analysis, including the origins and authority of the ICTY itself,
the reasoning behind the adoption of JCE, and the broader context and pur-
pose of ICL. When viewed in light of these factors, the application of JCE to
a low-level driver in a domestic prosecution becomes particularly concern-
ing.
1. Authority of the ICTY As Institution
Several scholars who have acknowledged the formal prohibitions on ju-
dicial lawmaking in international law have sought to justify the reality of
said lawmaking by suggesting that courts such as the ICTY are acting as
state agents, exercising a form of delegated authority.2" Thus, the ICTY
(and other courts like it) derives legitimacy from exercising the power of
states to make law, and state practice can be imputed to it. While this ra-
tionale seems persuasive when looking to judicial institutions created
pursuant to a consent-based treaty regime, such as the WTO, 265 it seems far
less applicable in the case of the ad hoc tribunals. Both the ICTY and its sis-
ter ICTR were imposed by the Security Council. Their jurisdiction was
limited to states whose consent was decidedly not implicated in the creation
of the tribunals.
Alternatively, other scholars argue that even if the ICTY was not con-
sciously designed to engage in this type of customary lawmaking, it is still
exercising a form of implied delegated authority that derives from the gap-
filled and ambiguous language of its statute.26 6 Whether this result was due
to deliberate compromise or inadvertent failure to supplement an underde-
veloped body of law, the U.N. Security Council would have been aware that
the ICTY would need to engage in substantial judicial innovation in order to
264. See BOAS, supra note 226, at 112 (discussing ICJ jurisprudence as a "de facto
normative system of precedent" that relies on persuasive authority); Danner, supra note 42, at
41-42; Ginsburg, supra note 226, at 641-42; Powderly, supra note 230, at 22-32; Sha-
habuddeen, supra note 230, at 184-87.
265. ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, AMSTERDAM CTR. FOR INT'L LAW, ON
THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS: AN APPRAISAL IN LIGHT OF THEIR BURGEON-
ING PUBLIC AUTHORITY 3-4 (ACIL Research Paper No. 2012-10, 2012), available at
http://ssm.comL/abstract=2084079; Cohen, supra note 39, at 273; Ginsburg, supra note 226, at
639.
266. CASSESE, supra note 62, at 7-9; Ginsburg, supra note 226, at 635. Allison Danner
has suggested viewing the ICTY as "an example of an agent that has contravened the instruc-
tions of the principal but has somehow escaped discipline. Or, the ICTY judges may have
acted as a sophisticated agent that understood what the principals desired, even in the face of
seemingly contradictory political rhetoric." Danner, supra note 42, at 43. The problem with
the latter view of tribunals as faithful agents is that it relies too heavily on a conscious body of
international community representatives who are aware of what the courts are doing and the
implications of those actions, and who have an ability to communicate and coordinate a re-
sponse to correct unfaithful actions. Moreover, one could argue that many of the distinctions in
the Rome Statute are just such a response.
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fulfill its broad mandate. Indeed, this is the argument made by the ICTY it-
self in justifying some of its more expansive doctrines.26 7
Yet the history of the establishment of the ICTY seems to indicate that
little thought was given to the statute, in part because it was believed to be a
sui generis institution, a one-off designed to assuage international anxiety
about the failure to otherwise act in Bosnia. The ICTY was created pursuant
to a U.N. Security Council resolution as a primary response to a conflict
whose atrocities were accelerating by the day.26 8 The statute and its legal
underpinnings were not the subject of extensive debate or analysis prior to
its adoption. Rather, facing a dilemma of political inaction and popular deri-
sion at the lack of intervention in Bosnia, the Security Council hurriedly
issued a resolution adopting a report by the Secretary-General that would
constitute the ICTY's organic statute.26 9 The direction that the ICTY apply
only those rules of international humanitarian law that "are beyond any
doubt part of customary law" casts further doubt on the idea that the U.N.
Security Council anticipated the role the ICTY would play in developing an
entire field of international law through judicial gap filling.27 0 Concerns
about its repercussions for international law were allayed by assurances that
it would have none. 27 ' The rapidity with which the United Nations estab-
lished what in retrospect may be seen as one of the most important
developments in modern international law can be seen as due to the antici-
pated unimportance it was to have.2 72 This intended inapplicability proved a
paradox: it at once obviated the concerns of the Security Council in leaving
the tribunal with little but a vague jurisdictional mandate drawn from
sketchy precedent and simultaneously necessitated that the tribunal engage
in the very lawmaking it was proscribed from doing. While there has been
an undoubted necessity for gap filling, that need does little to legitimate the
court's authority or reasoning in doing so.
Granting the many criticisms of the ICTY's persuasive logic, prior to
2000, its jurisprudence occupied the field of modern ICL. A decade ago the
ICTY may thus have been said to have exercised a discursive dominance,
providing a jurisprudential baseline from which other courts must at least
begin their reasoning. 273 This is no longer the case, as the establishment of
267. Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, 91 189-194 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (justifying JCE as deriving from the object and
purpose of the ICTY statute and the nature of the atrocity crimes within the jurisdiction of the
tribunal).
268. RATNER ET AL., supra note 95, at 3-9.
269. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993); CASSESE, supra note 62, at
324-38.
270. Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 103, 134.
271. Id. 29; Danner, supra note 42, at 20-23, 37.
272. See Danner, supra note 42, at 22, 37, 41-42, 49.
273. See BOAS, supra note 226, at 113-14; BOGDANDY & VENZKE, supra note 265, at
10; Cassese, supra note 217, at 110; Cohen, supra note 39, at 266-68; Ginsburg, supra note
226, at 640-42.
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the ICC and the ratification of the Rome Statute by more than half of the
world's states274 has undermined this prior dominance. Conflicts between
the Rome Statute or the ICC's decisions and those of the ICTY challenge
the characterization of the ICTY as (deliberate or inadvertent) faithful agent;
notably, this is the case with regard to JCE. Even if one were to accept that
in its early days the ICTY and its judicial innovations were made with the
tacit approval of the U.N. Security Council, the establishment of the ICC
would seem to have bracketed this project. A majority of the world's states
negotiated the bounds of international criminal liability under which they
consented to be bound.275 The result was a product of substantially greater
detail than anything contained in the ICTY and ICTR statutes and, in some
areas, notably different from emerging jurisprudence from the tribunals.
While the tribunals were never explicitly restrained in their actions by the
states or the U.N. Security Council that created them, the Rome Statute and
the ICC's subsequent jurisprudence seems to be a rebuke to the human
rights dominance of the ICTY. Not only have the pre-trial chambers sought
to distinguish and constrain the broad JCE liability used at the ICTY, but the
Rome Statute has enshrined a high level of specificity in the categorization
of criminal elements and theories of liability and has explicitly included the
principles of legality and specificity among its provisions. 276 At the very
least, this indicates discord among the community of states as to the proper
limits of ICL; at most, it illustrates a subtle if firm rejection of the ICTY's
larger ICL innovations.
2. The Persuasive Authority of the ICTY's JCE Analysis
Notwithstanding the authority accorded to the ICTY generally, many of
its legal pronouncements have been cited by other international and national
courts and incorporated into domestic legal standards. 277 However, not all of
its determinations have met with such broad acceptance; its legal reasoning
justifying the adoption of JCE as a mode of liability has been one of its most
controversial.2 78 Despite being "recognized" over a decade ago, it continues
to receive criticism.
The legal rationale of JCE is largely a product of the tribunal's origins
and the statutory inadequacies discussed above. The ICTY was established
in the midst of an ongoing conflict and appeared intended to serve as a sub-
stitute for other forms of international intervention. From the outset, it was
faced with the expectation that a strong mandate could deter and prevent
further war crimes and help impose an element of restraint among the par-
ties to the conflict. Yet the ICTY had limited resources and staff and no
274. Status of the Rome Statute, supra note 159.
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 32, arts. 22-24.
277. Danner, supra note 42, at 45.
278. Danner & Martinez, supra note 91, at 108; Darcy & Powderly, supra note 40, at 8.
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independent ability to actually arrest and bring to trial suspected war crimi-
nals.279
It was in this setting that the ICTY faced its first merits case, a case in
which it realized that it would need a theory of liability like JCE if it were
ever to be able to convict the leaders the world deemed most responsible for
the atrocities but whom the tribunal would be hard pressed to physically tie
to the commission of individual crimes. Tadid, who it is unlikely would have
ever seen the inside of the tribunal in the later years because of the comple-
tion strategy of focusing on only the most serious crimes, was the first
defendant in a merits trial, a trial that established the modes of liability for
later "big fish." 280
In seeking to hold Tadid liable for the five murders that likely occurred
in his presence, but not necessarily by his hand, the ICTY identified JCE as
a mode of liability in customary international law. 28 1 However, its analysis
of JCE's status in customary law has been heavily criticized, and rightly so,
as it engages in much the same problematic and haphazard analysis of a
scattered cross section of WWII cases, domestic criminal laws, and treaties
as did the CMCR.2 82 Indeed, the entire ICTY defense bar maintains that JCE
does not exist as a matter of customary international law. 283 Former ICTY
President Antonio Cassese has admitted that tribunal judges, particularly in
the early days, were aware they were developing a legal field and regularly
utilized judgments as vehicles for designing a new body of law.2 84 To justify
the adoption of JCE as a legitimate exercise of the ICTY's necessary gap-
filling authority, there would need to be an actual gap to fill. Although the
tribunal chose to read such a gap (by way of the object and purpose) into the
statute, the statute's modes-of-liability provision does not on its face neces-
sitate this outcome. It could in fact just as easily be read to proscribe
liability where defendants could not be convicted of ordering, planning, in-
stigating, committing, or aiding and abetting a crime within the statute.285
The decision to expand liability beyond the usual meaning of these modes
was at its heart a policy decision-although perhaps a perfectly rational one,
279. RATNER ET AL., supra note 95, at 212-14; Bartram S. Brown, The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: INTERNA-
TIONAL ENFORCEMENT 69, 96-99 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2008).
280. See Brown, supra note 279, at 99-101.
281. Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, [ 616-617 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
282. See id. 195-226; Danner, supra note 42, at 47; Ohlin, supra note 91, at 707-08.
283. Amicus Brief of Association of Defence Counsel-ICTY 4, Prosecutor v.
Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3,
2007), http://icr.icty.org/ (available through the Court Records database).
284. Cassese, supra note 231, at 5 89-90.
285. It is particularly interesting that, rather than read JCE into the potentially ambigu-
ous phrasing of "otherwise aiding and abetting" contained in Article 7, the ICTY chose to
create a new form of "committing" in order to ensure a broad doctrine for primary, rather than
secondary, liability. See ICTY Statute, supra note 104, art. 7.
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the very kind of decision that seems proscribed under formal public interna-
tional law.
The tenuousness of this customary law analysis-the only ground on
which the ICTY could justify the adoption of JCE-is highlighted by its
persistent refusal to revisit it. Since it first articulated JCE in Tadi6, the
ICTY has steadfastly held to the very concept of stare decisis, which does
not formally operate in international law, to avoid confronting those criti-
cisms. 286 If JCE in fact existed as a customary rule prior to the Tadi6
decision, than any court should be able replicate a similar customary inter-
national law analysis and locate JCE without reference to the tribunal's own
judgment. That such a task proves so difficult is demonstrative of the prob-
lems underlying the tribunal's jurisprudence. In effect, that single opinion of
heavily criticized analysis has served to justify the routine use of an expan-
sive doctrine, unhindered by precise limits to its scope or application.287
Finally, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has refused to refine the doctrine
by imposing clear limitations and standards and has actively rejected at-
tempts by the Trial Chamber to do so. Instead, the Appeals Chamber has
chosen to rely on prosecutorial discretion to impose constraints on JCE in
practice. The Appeals Chamber has expressly rejected defendant concerns
about the potential breadth of JCE on the grounds that the prosecution has
never indulged in such expansive pleading.288 At the very least, it seems in-
appropriate to apply the textual elements of the doctrine, which the ICTY
has left purposefully broad, without engaging with the charging practice of
the prosecutor, which the tribunal itself has relied on as a formative con-
straint.
Although the ICTY and ICTR, which share a single Appeals Chamber,
have used JCE ubiquitously, the trend among a number of international
courts has been to constrain that doctrine. Extended JCE has been rejected
(albeit as a matter of statutory interpretation) by the hybrid Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,289 while the ICC has initially rejected
it in its entirety.290 In lieu of the broad doctrine, the ICC has thus far differ-
entiated coperpetrator liability along a spectrum that more closely
corresponds to the original commentary to the International Law Commis-
sion Draft Code and has established a significant-contribution requirement
for even its most attenuated form of liability.291 While past silence by the in-
ternational community in the face of JCE's deployment at the ICTY may
286. Danner, supra note 42, at 34-35; Ohlin, supra note 91, at 712.
287. See Ohlin, supra note 91, at 716 (discussing the attempts by the Trial Chamber in
Stakic and Kvocka to reject JCE and adopt a coperpetration doctrine similar to that adopted by
the ICC).
288. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, [427 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007).
289. Ohlin, supra note 91, at 712-13.
290. See Part II.B.
291. See Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 97; text accompanying supra notes 98-99.
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have arguably implied a tacit acceptance, the now explicit discord registered
by the ICC must be considered.
3. Implicit Limitations: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Object and
Purpose of ICL
As noted in Tadid, JCE was adopted by the court despite any textual ba-
sis in the statute. Instead, the tribunal relied on the "object and purpose" of
its creation, which it felt would be defeated without the doctrine. 29 2 Interna-
tional criminal law, although a derivation of the laws of war, is also distinct
from it. It is a fusion of "international human rights law, domestic criminal
law, and transitional justice. Each one, to varying degrees, informs the pur-
poses and principles of international prosecution, and their interaction
creates conflicts within international criminal law itself."293 It is a product of
the international community's response to the proliferation of intracommu-
nal conflict and mass atrocity during the 1990s. 294 Its doctrinal evolution has
been informed by the unique objectives heralded by international practition-
ers, scholars, and policy makers alike to provide an effective response to the
phenomenon of collective violence presented by these conflicts.2 95 For ex-
ample, legal scholars and practitioners have championed this form of
retributive justice as essential for deterrence, incapacitation, individual
accountability, rehabilitation, reconciliation, establishing truth, creating a
historical record, doing justice for victims, combating impunity, conflict
resolution, and strengthening the rule of law. 29 6 This multifaceted purpose
has led to conflicting trends in the development of ICL's substantive law.
Several scholars have recently drawn attention to the conflict between the
human rights focus on accountability and the criminal justice focus on rights
of the accused.297 Whereas the former has provided the impetus for broad
theories of liability in the quest for accountability, such legal reasoning is
anathema to a criminal justice approach and the principles of legality and
specificity, which require explicit notice and prohibit the expansion of crim-
292. Tadid Appeals Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, I 189-194 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
293. Danner & Martinez, supra note 91, at 78.
294. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 95, at 8-9; Caroline Fournet, Mass Atrocity: Theo-
ries and Concepts of Accountability-On the Schizophrenia of Accountability, in EXPLORING
THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 27, 29-35 (Ralph Henham & Mark
Findlay eds., 2011). See generally Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities
After Conflict: What Impact on Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 251 (2007)
(discussing measures taken after the atrocities of the 1990s).
295. Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking
the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 578-79 (2002).
296. See Leslie Vijamuri & Jack Snyder, Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of In-
ternational War Crime Tribunals and Transitional Justice, 7 ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 345, 347-52
(2004).
297. See BOGDANDY & VENZKE, supra note 265, at 23; CASSESE, supra note 62, at 8, 37-
48; Danner & Martinez, supra note 91, at 96.
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inal liability by analogy.298 These principles were subsequently incorporated
explicitly in the Rome Statute of the ICC.2 99
Within this context, expansive forms of liability such as JCE may not
seem troubling when used to prosecute a head of state such as Slobodan Mi-
logevi6; indeed, JCE may seem not only appropriate but necessary. Yet an
application of such liability to ensnare individuals like Hamdan in contra-
vention of more stringent domestic criminal norms seems strikingly
disproportionate. This is in part because ICL has largely developed as a
unique response to mass atrocity and collective violence. In attempting to
develop a normative understanding of ICL as a distinct body of law, Kirsten
Fisher has suggested that what is unique about the situations addressed by
ICL is the combination of severe deprivations of physical security and an
associational aspect. 00 That is, in cases of mass atrocity, political identity
and association define the actors and methods of the violence, implicate the
use of political institutions and resources, and frequently coincide with the
breakdown of political accountability and the rule of law. Atrocities are
crimes that "often [arise] out of a travesty of political power."3 01
The nature of the violence and its roots in sociopolitical associations
create a multiplicity of demands on international tribunals in a way atypical
of domestic criminal trials and create dilemmas in the attribution of liability,
particularly when the breadth of that liability is being newly defined in the
wake of competing demands. The sheer scale of crimes committed through
such collective or communal violence relies on the complicity of an array of
individuals: from political masterminds and low-level perpetrators to
neighbor-on-neighbor violence and even bystanders, "totalizing experiences
necessitate totalizing responses."302 Although the ICTY's first merits case
involved a low-level perpetrator, the subsequent history of ICL, and of
transitional justice more generally, has been one of focusing international
prosecutions on the gravest crimes committed by the most responsible
individuals. The residual liability for crimes or actors falling outside this
implicit gravity threshold is left to a diverse array of transitional-justice
mechanisms. While a comprehensive survey of such mechanisms may help
to inform customary international rules, anecdotal evidence demonstrates
diversity rather than consensus as the norm for dealing with these lesser
forms of participation in even the most heinous of crimes.303 This in turn
298. See CASSESE, supra note 62, at 37-48.
299. Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 22.
300. See KIRSTEN J. FISHER, MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw: HOLDING AGENTS OF ATROCITY ACCOUNTABLE TO THE WORLD 23, 73-75 (2012).
301. Id. at 23.
302. Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 295, at 639.
303. See generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE
TERROR AND ATROCITY (2001) (discussing truth commissions); BURYING THE PAST: MAKING
PEACE AND DOING JUSTICE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT (Nigel Biggar ed., 2001) (discussing the
aftermath of intemational crimes); MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN
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reflects the lack of a global consensus on how to address lesser forms of
participation in international crimes.
The inherent discrepancies in how ICL treats organizational leaders, on
one hand, and low-level participants and the swathes of society that were
"swept-up in the inexorable process of killing,"304 on the other, should be
viewed as an inherent limitation implicit in most charges before the tribu-
nals. Such limitations-whether viewed as a pragmatic result of limited
resources or normative preferences by practitioners-are evidenced at the
ICTY not in explicit statutory provisions or judicial opinions but in the use
of prosecutorial discretion in charging.
To the extent that courts may look to ICL precedent for evidence of cus-
tomary law, it is informative to look at what is not found in the decisions.
From the role of de-Nazification boards30s and the gravity limitations im-
posed on the ad hoc tribunals, 3 06 hybrid tribunals, and the Rome Statute07 to
the myriad domestic mechanisms that supplement formal criminal liability,
ICL has relied on prosecutorial discretion (with rare judicial intervention) to
define its substantive limitations. Whether patterns of such discretion reflect
normative preference, legal analysis, or the simple practicality of resource
constraints, this reality rather than the ICTY's rhetoric better explains the
lack of factual analogues to Hamdan and Al Bahlul.
D. The Judicialization of International Law and the
Fiction of the Doctrine of Sources
This analysis, however, rests on continued reliance on the doctrine of
sources, in reality a fiction of international law. In light of the judicialization
of international law, this formal doctrinal constraint is little more than an
anachronism. To disclaim over a decade of jurisprudence as mere scholarly
opinion based on this formalist fiction seems absurd given the dominant role
courts have come to play in international law. ICL is a body of law: it is one
that is increasingly relied on and applied by states. Whether intentional or
not, the effective delegation of its development by states to the international
judiciary must be recognized in the wake of the last two decades.
Yet to cast aside the constraints imposed by public international law's
formalities without an alternative framework in place presents the dangers
exemplified by the cases of Hamdan and Al Bahlul. Without reliance on the
doctrine of sources and its limitations on the ICTY's authority, it is unclear
what, if anything, may restrain courts from engaging in their own innovation
and using ICTY rhetoric to impose historically novel criminal liability under
the guise of opaque customary law. Indeed, the uncertainty of customary
THE AFTERMATH OF MASs ATROCITY (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) (dis-
cussing how countries rebuild after ethnic cleansing and genocide).
304. Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 295, at 577.
305. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 91, at 114.
306. RATNER ET AL., supra note 95, at 220-22.
307. Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 17(1)(d); ICTY Statute, supra note 104, art. 1.
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law has long been the font of judicial creativity.3 08 The emergence of this de
facto international common law in the face of a de jure rejection of its legit-
imacy is nowhere more evident than in ICL, nor are its repercussions more
important. Harlan Cohen has suggested that now may be international law's
Erie moment, a reference to the U.S. Supreme Court case that recognized
the fiction of a federal common law and the injustice, or at least arbitrari-
ness, that arose from continuing to rely on it.3 9 Hamdan and Al Bahlul
present a wake-up call to international scholars and jurists that international
law, and international criminal law in particular, has reached a tipping point.
New frameworks are needed that transcend this statist fiction, recognize the
role that nonstate actors play, and address the increased delegation and reli-
ance by states on international courts to clarify and develop the law.
Such a framework must not just result in a reinvigorated role for courts
that accords with the actual dominant role they have had in shaping interna-
tional legal norms. It must lay out a system of precedent and interpretation
that guides both international and domestic courts in applying rules within
and between legal regimes. It must offer a mechanism for weighing authori-
ty among courts. For example, such persuasive authority, not unlike state
action, could be acknowledged to contribute to the development of custom-
ary rules when sufficient court practice, just as when sufficient state
practice, can evidence a newly crystallized rule. Explicitly recognizing such
a role for courts under the theory of courts as state agents accords with and
even protects the role of states in developing international law. A renewed
appreciation for the ability of courts to "make law" if they are not con-
strained by their principals will create an impetus for states to take
cognizance of the way in which their ostensible agents are interpreting cus-
tomary and treaty law and encourage greater discussion and intervention
when judicial innovation strays too far. Moreover, recognizing internally
binding precedent or source hierarchy, perhaps with certain specified excep-
tions, could help systematize the internal coherence of legal regimes. This
seems particularly important in the imposition of criminal liability, which
has generally been understood to prioritize notice to the defendant, and the
need to minimize arbitrariness in application to similarly situated defend-
ants. Finally, such a framework should clarify the way in which decisions
deriving from peculiar contexts may, if ever, be used outside those factual
scenarios. Although rarely expressly reflected in opinions, the unique con-
text, divergent rationales, and multiplicity of demands on ICL prosecutions
have shaped the procedural and substantive development of this body of law.
Such foundations need to be clearly analyzed to determine when and how
ICL principles should be borrowed in other contexts.
308. Ginsburg, supra note 226, at 640.
309. See generally Cohen, supra note 39.
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CONCLUSION
There may be much to applaud in a system of international law moving
toward judicial precedent as a basis for legal evolution. However, such
unprecedented moves absent a conscious and critical acceptance by the
international community, and a framework providing guidance as to the
limitations and manner in which such jurisprudence is applied, are
dangerous. That danger is reflected in the way in which context-specific ad
hoc tribunals have been able to "recast the laws of war" 310 without oversight
or safeguards due to their monopoly on the subject matter, as well as in the
way that judicial rhetoric has been detached from its factual foundations and
applied outside its intended context, as U.S. courts have done. Although
definitive reliance on evolving ICL doctrine is incorrect as a formal matter,
there is scant legal doctrine to prevent such misuse.
In the absence of a guiding framework, courts should be careful to
adopt a narrow application of ICL norms that takes account of their underly-
ing rationale and context. As Judge Korman counseled in recommending a
"norm-by-norm analysis,"31' courts applying ICL analogies should recog-
nize the aforementioned discrepancies and contradictions within the ICTY's
doctrine and seek to resolve them by reference to the context and reasoning
that gave rise to them. JCE is a doctrine designed to serve a body of law
whose purpose is to provide accountability and justice to societies riven by
mass atrocity. It responds to the type of violent conflict that is predicated on
centralized mobilization by political leaders of massive swathes of the popu-
lation and where traditional theories of domestic criminal law render it
difficult to convict wily leaders careful to remain physically remote from the
crimes they orchestrate. JCE is meant to expand liability's reach up, not
down, the chain of culpability. The ICC's most recent decisions can be seen
as clarifying this issue by constraining the expansion of liability down the
ranks. While the rhetoric so oft quoted from ICTY opinions frequently fails
to reflect this reality, the facts of the cases before the tribunal are telling. By
looking beyond the words to the conduct that animates them, courts will be
forced to engage in a more nuanced and more loyal analysis of international
law; in doing so they will find little support for the MCA's material support
offense in any international criminal tribunal.
310. For example, Danner has suggested that there is evidence that some jurisdictions
have evidenced acceptance of the ICTY's authority by incorporating language from decisions
into their military manuals, although this does not necessarily extend to JCE. Danner, supra
note 42, at 45.
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